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I.

INTRODUCTION

In fifteen years of teaching Corporations and Securities Regulation, and various
seminars on business law, I have failed to give the subject of corporate social
responsibility its due. This is surprising because my interest in corporate social
responsibility issues was a significant part of what led me to become a law professor.
This interest in corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) took hold notwithstanding
that I do not recall hearing much about the subject during law school.1 The omission
is especially startling because I went to a self-consciously liberal law school committed
to using law as an instrument of progressive social change. But social welfare
concerns were not manifest in my business law courses. They were not then, and I
would be surprised if they are now. To paraphrase what Duncan Kennedy once told
me, after the 1980s the public law curriculum inherited critical theory; the private
law curriculum—markets. Hence, even twenty years after my graduation, it is still
unlikely that law students learn much about corporate social responsibility in the
basic business law courses.
1.

What led me to the CSR question was not my law studies, but my graduate studies. Unlike many future
business law professors, I did not head for a graduate economics department. Instead, I completed three
years of post-graduate study in a Ph.D. program in Yale University’s Department of Renaissance
Studies. As even a brief survey of the period reveals, these were formative years in the development of
banking and trade, cities and markets, and power struggles between commercial, political, and religious
institutions. This graduate work has led me to a socio-economic perspective on corporate law and
market regulation—a perspective in which firms and market participants are appropriately analyzed
through a broad cultural lens.
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This article considers the explanations for this omission and its significance for
American legal education, future corporate lawyers, and society. It begins with a
discussion of practical impediments to teaching CSR as part of the law school
curriculum. It then provides a brief history of CSR—which is increasingly being
referred to as corporate social “accountability.”2 Next it discusses the traditional
Corporations and Securities Regulation courses, noting where CSR issues could
easily be integrated into each course’s traditional framework. Its final section
proposes that the subject of corporate disclosure or “corporate transparency” can be
used as a bridge between the traditional curriculum and the study of CSR. The
article’s thesis is that curricular reform in the area of CSR is crucially important to
the future of legal education, as well as our society’s broader wellbeing.
As successful corporate lawyers appreciate, we live in a world where hard laws
and regulations operate in tandem with softer, more eclectic forms of setting
standards. At the same time, corporations operate in an environment of increasingly
global competition and constant media exposure. In this complex environment, the
penalties arising from reputational damage are increasing, and the financial rewards
from running a genuinely disciplined, principled enterprise are likely to increase.
Corporate lawyers will have an increasingly central role in promoting the benefits
companies can garner from CSR in terms of supporting ethical leadership, greater
corporate transparency, and civil society capacity building. Facing these challenges,
corporate leaders will increasingly need their legal advisors to help them build wealth
for the long term.
For twenty-five years, law schools have been gearing up to meet this challenge.
Perhaps because law is so technical, business law education has remained essentially
micro-analytic in its orientation. And while law schools are struggling to keep their
students up-to-date with the growing technical detail in the law, they have also been
criticized for falling short in skills development—in relation to fact-finding,
negotiating, and drafting, for example.3 Helping law students synthesize different
areas of law and cultivate judgment and vision, are even larger challenges. But these
challenges are ones law schools must take seriously in order to help future corporate
lawyers prepare for their role in counseling ethical corporations.
II. PRACTICAL IMPEDIMENTS TO TEACHING CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY

Limited time is the first challenge to teaching CSR. In the basic Corporations
and Securities Regulation courses, I feel a significant responsibility to help my
students prepare for the nuts and bolts of corporate and securities law practice.
2.

I use the term corporate social responsibility herein because corporate social accountability is of such
recent vintage. However, the latter term is probably more appropriate because CSR is about companies
taking full responsibility for their costs and the resources they consume/depend upon. “Accountability”
reflects this concern nicely; it also captures the emphasis on transparency in CSR studies.

3.

See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, Report of the Task
Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, at ch. 7 (Robert MacCrate ed.,
1992), available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/publications/onlinepubs/maccrate.html.
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Corporate law is especially doctrinally challenging because it incorporates and builds
upon several areas of law—contract, property, tort, trust, civil procedure, professional
responsibility, and federal securities law, for example. Furthermore, corporate legal
rules and judicial opinions make little sense to students unfamiliar with basic
principles of corporate finance. Absent such financial understanding, students
cannot appreciate the judicial analysis of mergers, assets sales, financings, and
recapitalizations set forth in the case law.4 Hence a review of basic financial principles
is part of the syllabus. It seems essential to proceed slowly in the basic business law
courses, to involve students in sifting through the legal doctrines as applied to precise
transactional settings. In this fashion students can begin to prepare themselves for
the live version. Nevertheless, this immersive approach to the basic Corporations
and Securities Regulation courses leaves little time for bigger policy discussions,
including those relevant to CSR.
The traditional answer is to leave broader synthesis and in-depth analysis to
seminars. Along these lines, in the spring of 2008 I developed a seminar focusing on
W.R. Grace & Co. (“Grace”). The course focused on Grace’s problems with
disclosure and legal compliance across a broad range of subject areas, including the
company’s dealings with the SEC, the EPA, OSHA, and the Department of Justice.5
It also focused on the relative roles of private litigation and civil and criminal
enforcement.
But seminars present their own, distinct problems for legal education. Most law
students focus principally on preparing themselves for the professional challenges
they foresee upon graduation. Rather than taking seminars, which would deepen
their understanding of the law, they often prefer to expand their knowledge base in
the hope of lighter lifting come bar time. Second, students may shy away from
taking seminars because they fear the additional work or the closer scrutiny associated
with them, or that the success they have had on traditional short-answer exams may
not carry over to seminar work, which typically requires not only consistent class
participation but also the completion of a research paper. If many law students do
not take seminars, then leaving crucially important subjects to be covered in them is
problematic. What is and is not included in the basic business law courses is therefore
of great importance for legal education and future corporate lawyers.
Another impediment to teaching CSR-related seminars is the absence of
innovative, up-to-date course materials. This is a general problem in the business
law area, but a more acute problem with respect to CSR, because less attention has
been devoted to the subject. Of course, the development of new course materials and
pedagogical approaches takes substantial time. But law schools do not encourage
professors to invest substantial time in developing new teaching materials. Research
grant funding is rarely made available for this purpose. Teaching materials, no
4.

For an excellent casebook in this area, see William W. Bratton, Corporate Finance: Cases and
Materials (6th ed. 2008).

5.

See Indictment ¶¶ 185–190, United States v. W.R. Grace, 504 F.3d 745 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. CR 05-07M-DWM); Lisa Heinzerling, Knowing Killing and Environmental Law, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 521, 524
(2006).
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matter how innovative, are not regarded as having the importance or prestige
attributed to scholarship. This inhibits innovation in the law school curriculum as it
relates to CSR. In sum, the absence of CSR-related course materials remains a
problem for legal education, especially given law schools’ commitment to training
the next century’s global corporate legal advisors.
Nevertheless, market forces, including the market for law degrees, may lead to
greater attentiveness to CSR.6 Law schools are reckoning with globalization both at
the curricular and the institutional level, and the two are related. In an increasingly
mobile, interconnected world, law students are becoming more sensitive to the need
to think globally. In this respect, CSR (perhaps under the rubric of “sustainability”)
may become a hot issue that law schools will use to distinguish themselves. Workers’
demands for fair wages and safe conditions; public outcry over climate change;
tradeoffs between privacy rights, information possessed by corporations, and national
security; competing free speech claims on the part of corporate employers, employees,
and investors—all of these issues are part of the CSR analysis. And lawyers familiar
with corporate law will be at the center of all these controversies. Companies like
Google, Yahoo!, and Microsoft, and their lawyers, have learned hard lessons about
the relationship between profits, human rights, and politics from doing business in
China.7 Mining and extractive industries, and their lawyers, have grappled with
these issues, across the globe, for decades. 8 The challenges for multinational
enterprises and their legal advisors are increasing exponentially; so will the costs for
lawyers who are unprepared to address them. These forces should lead law schools
to promote the study of CSR as part of their curricula.
III. FROM CSR TO CORPORATE SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

A. Academic Boundaries
Another challenge to CSR’s flourishing as a subject of study is that it has not
been recognized as a discrete academic field—neither in law schools or more generally.
Many academic and graduate programs touch upon the subject of businesses’ and
business leaders’ status in the broader, socio-political environment. Such academic
programs include management, economics, finance, sociology, history, philosophy,
cultural studies, and law. But each of these areas has an alternative focus. The
discussion of CSR is peripheral in each case.

6.

For a wonderful history of the development of legal education, see generally William P. LaPiana,
Logic and Experience: The Origin of Modern American Legal Education (1994).

7.

See Public Statement, Amnesty Int’l, Amnesty International Joins Multi Stakeholder Initiative on
Internet and Human Rights ( Jan. 23, 2007), available at www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?/
lang=e&id=ENGPOL300012007.

8.

See, e.g., Robert Dufresne, The Opacity of Oil: Oil Corporations, Internal Violence and International Law,
36 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 331 (2004).
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Ref lecting its cross-disciplinary nature and “belated” academic status, CSRoriented scholarship has yet to reach its full academic maturity.9 Its topical boundaries
are fluid and its methodologies are still evolving—and acceptance of change in the
academy is slow. Senior scholars in the area of CSR are not sufficiently numerous as
to be readily available as mentors. Younger scholars, laboring without tenure (and
hence needful of the approval of their academic superiors) might still be taking a risk
by focusing on CSR-related issues.10
Outside of the legal academy, there is more interest in CSR studies. After the
serial financial crises of the last decade, business schools are giving greater attention
to the subject of “ethical leadership.”11 Accelerating signs of climate change;
continued instances of high profile, international corporate corruption; and
consumers’ expressed preference for products that are less exploitative of the
environment, for example, are fostering a reorientation in business schools’ curricula
towards greater attentiveness to CSR issues.12
In addition, many universities are establishing new academic centers focusing on
“sustainability.” These centers typically offer some combination of engineering,
design, architecture, environmental science, consumer behavior, and public policy.13
As such, they are likely to fuel academic innovation in areas related to CSR. The
9.

For an exceptional review of developments in the CSR area, written by academics in different fields, see
Michael Bradley et al., Challenges to Corporate Governance: The Purposes and Accountability of the
Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, 62 L. & Contemp. Probs. 9
(1999).

10. For an extraordinarily innovative critique from one of the leading scholars in the field, see, for example,

Claire Moore Dickerson, Ozymandias As Community Project: Managerial/Corporate Social Responsibility
and the Failure of Transparency, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 1035, 1062 (2003); Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Story of
Pinocchio: Now I’m a Real Boy, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 829 (2004); Marleen O’Connor-Felman, American
Corporate Governance and Children: Investing in Our Future Human Capital During Turbulent Times, 77
S. Cal. L. Rev. 1258 (2004); Kellye Y. Testy, Capitalism and Freedom For Whom? Feminist Legal Theory
and Progressive Corporate Law, 67 L. Contemp. Probs. 87 (2004).
11.

The efforts of the Aspen Institute’s Program on Business and Society are targeted at this challenge. See
The Aspen Institute, Business and Society Program, http://www.aspeninstitute.org/policy-work/
business-society/about-business-society/program (last visited Mar. 4, 2009). Their mission statement
asserts:
The Business and Society Program is dedicated to developing leaders for a sustainable
global society. Through dialogues and path-breaking research, we create opportunities for
executives and educators to explore new pathways to sustainability and values-based
leadership. BSP’s websites, www.CasePlace.org and www.beyondgreypinstripes.org, are
the leading sources of innovative curriculum in top business schools around the world.
Id.

12. Id. Notably, there is no equivalent within the legal academy at this time.
13. See The Aspen Institute Center for Business Education, Sustainability Center Research Initiative,

Phase I, http://www.aspencbe.org/teaching/sustainability.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2009) (providing a
recent catalogue of such centers); The Aspen Institute, A Closer Look at Applied Sustainability
Centers (2008), available at http://www.aspencbe.org/documents/Applied%20Sustainability%20
Centers%20Final.pdf (discussing the rise in the number of centers focused on applied sustainability);
Claudia H. Deutsch, A Threat So Big, Academics Try Collaboration, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 2007, at A1
(discussing growing collaboration between graduate school programs on issues of sustainability).

822

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

VOLUME 53 | 2008/09

Obama administration’s expressed commitment to using environmentally friendly
technologies to rebuild infrastructure will also contribute to this greater awareness
and cross-disciplinary academic flourishing.
The United Nations is also taking action in areas related to CSR.14 In July 2005,
Kofi Annan appointed John Ruggie to serve as the Special Representative to the
Secretary General in the area of Business and Human Rights.15 (The business and
human rights framework is occupying a significant part of the CSR agenda in the
international sphere.) This initiative on the part of the United Nations is having an
influence on American universities in the area of CSR. For example, together with
Oxfam, Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government recently co-hosted a consultation
with Mr. Ruggie on the subject of non-judicial dispute resolution for human rights
claims against international businesses.16
B. Legal History
In developing an understanding of CSR, a brief look at legal history is in order.17
This history sheds light on the relative under-emphasis on CSR in corporate law.
Because CSR focuses on the conduct and influence of larger, public companies, it
was not a meaningful concept before the late nineteenth century. Until then, almost
all business transacting was essentially local in nature and generally thinly capitalized.
This meant that companies were more susceptible to local law and regulation. The
early pattern of incorporation or “chartering” also limited the potential for corporate
abuse. At first corporations were created by special acts (concessions) of the state’s
legislature. Corporations routinely requested a charter from the state where they
were principally located and doing business. These charters were typically granted
only where an enterprise’s commercial objectives coincided with the state’s larger
public-regarding ones.18 These natural and legal limits constrained the growth of
14.

See Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Report of the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral (SRSG) on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises,
delivered to the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/035 (Feb. 9, 2007);
Memorandum from Martin Lipton and Kevin S. Schwartz, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, A United
Nations Proposal Defining Corporate Social Responsibility for Human Rights, to clients (May 1,
2008), available at http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/files/wachtell_lipton_memo_on_
global_business_human_rights.pdf.

15.

Press Release, Secretary-General Appoints John Ruggie of United States Special Representative on
Issue of Human Rights, Transnational Corporations, Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc. SG/A/934
(July 29, 2005).

16. See Caroline Rees, Corporate Soc. Responsibility Initiative, Harvard Kennedy Sch., Access

to Remedies for Corporate Human Rights Impacts: Improving Non-Judicial Mechanisms
(2008).
17.

For an overview of the ebb and flow of attention to the CSR field, see C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles
of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-first Century, 51 Kan. L. Rev.
77 (2002).

18. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 390–400 (3d ed. 2005); James Willard

Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United States 1780–
1970 (1970) (providing seminal discussions of early corporate legal history).
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power in the corporate form. Leaving aside the railroads and large oil trusts, through
this period corporations posed little threat to states’ ability to regulate in the public
interest.
By the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, industrialization had
progressed substantially, and the states enacted general laws of incorporation that
fostered the conduct of business in the corporate form. The earliest incorporation
laws limited the scope of legitimate corporate activity, corporations’ ability to raise
capital, and corporations’ ability to hold stock in other corporations.19 But these
limits were quickly abandoned once the states realized the revenue generating
potential of collecting franchise fees from companies that incorporated in their state.
Indeed, the lure of franchise fees motivated the states to allow incorporation even by
businesses that were neither located in nor doing significant business within their
state. When New Jersey (the early front runner) proved indecisive about the direction
of its corporate laws, Delaware took the lead. As a small state it had much to gain
from franchise fees, especially the larger ones payable by public companies.
Furthermore, because Delaware had few public companies concentrated in the state,
its lawmakers could craft corporate laws without pressure from powerful, potentially
adverse in-state constituencies. In this respect, the specialization of corporate
law—the separation between corporate issues and ones relating to third parties’
interests—was an indelible feature of its early development. The areas of concern
identified with CSR were relegated to other areas of law. With Delaware’s ascendancy,
the political power base that pushed for loose, open-ended corporate laws (principally
corporate managers) was divorced from politically enfranchised, in-state interests.20
This historical development of what is deemed “corporate law” has proven to be
sticky. It remains true to this day, and it has had a substantial normative influence
on the study of corporate law and CSR. Atomization of different areas of law relevant
to CSR (laws and regulations governing shareholder voice, labor organization,
workers’ safety, environmental quality, creditors’ rights, and corporate political
conduct) has forestalled the evolution of CSR teaching and scholarship within law
schools. Atomization and specialization within law have made it much harder to
piece together the CSR puzzle.21
Returning to early corporate legal history: necessity sometimes pushed businesses
where the law had not. As large enterprises such as railroads struggled to expand
rapidly, they became sensitive to the necessity of supporting their workforce’s basic
needs. To meet these needs, the railroads were early contributors to the development
19.

See Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility: A Continuation of Willard Hurst’s Study
of Corporations, 49 Am. U. L. Rev. 81 (1999) (documenting the early history of corporate form).

20. For discussion of Delaware’s stake in corporate law, see Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice

of Forum and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 Del. J. Corp. L. 57 (2009).
21.

For further discussion of this theme, that complexity obfuscates vital questions within corporate law, see
Reza Dibadj, Delayering Corporate Law, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 469 (2006); Faith Stevelman Kahn,
Legislatures, Courts and the SEC: Reflections on Silence and Power in Corporate Law, 41 N.Y.L. Sch. L.
Rev. 1107 (1997). For further background, see Kent Greenfield, The Failure of Corporate Law,
Fundamental Flaws and Progressive Possibilities (2007).
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of the YMCA.22 And Henry Ford’s efforts to “raise up” his workers’ quality of
life—extraordinarily intrusive and paternalistic as they were—are well
documented.23
After the stock market crash in 1929 and in the years of the Great Depression,
large businesses were hardly in a position to address the needs of their workers,
creditors, or local communities. The rise of New Deal era legislation (and its ultimate
acceptance by the federal courts) validated the federal government’s role in protecting
workers’ and consumers’ safety.24 In the 1930s, Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C.
Means’s seminal book The Modern Corporation and Private Property discussed the
status of large businesses in the rapid modernization and industrialization of the
United States.25 Their work openly asked whether the growing ranks of publicly
held companies were properly conceived of as the private property of their owners or,
rather, as socio-economic institutions capable of shaping their financial and political
environment to their private advantage, and sometimes the public’s disadvantage.
Berle and Means’s writing has had a seminal impact on the modern field of corporate
law. But academic corporate law has focused principally on the economic implications
of separating ownership (equity investment) from control (boards and senior executive
officers). Far less attention has been paid to the authors’ expressed concern that
massive capital accumulation in the corporate form might pose a threat to democratic
social order in the United States.26
The 1950s has been described as the “era of managerialism.”27 In this period,
economic growth and prosperity were sufficiently widespread and sustained to defer
debate over businesses’ broader responsibilities to society. But by the mid-1970s,
22.

See F. Emerson Andrews, Corporation Giving 23–26 (Russell Sage Foundation 1952) (1903)
(providing an account of the relationship between the development of the railroads and the YMCA
movement). See generally Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of
Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 579, 594–600 (1997) (discussing early corporate giving laws
from the perspective of corporate governance).

23.

For discussion of Ford’s “benevolent” intrusion into the personal lives of his employees, see Stuart
Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism 1880–1940, at 88–89 (1976) (describing how Ford
conditioned a $5 per day wage on his employees being made subject to intense home inspection for
wholesomeness and adherence to middle class values); Douglas G. Brinkley, Wheels for the
World: Henry Ford, His Company, and a Century of Progress (2003); Allan Nevins, Ford:
The Times, The Man, The Company 553–54 (1954).

24.

See generally Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution: ERIE, the
Judicial Power, and the Politics of the Federal Courts in Twentieth-Century America
197–216 (2000).

25.

See Adolph A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property (1933).

26. For example, this was evident from the tenor of most of the papers presented at a Columbia Conference

celebrating the 75th Anniversary of Berle and Means’s Groundbreaking Book on Business Law. See
Press Release, Columbia Law School, CLS Hosts Conference Celebrating 75th Anniversary of Berle
Book (Dec. 3, 2007), available at www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news_events/2007/
December07/ berle_75th (providing a description of the conference).
27.

See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1931, 1982 (1991)
(describing 1950s as the “high tide of benevolent managerialism”).
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concern over corporate abuses once again erupted. Against the background of the
Vietnam War (and corporate support for the war), there were discoveries of widespread
corporate bribery and other unlawful payments at home and abroad, early concerns
about corporate water and air pollution, and a growing awareness of multinationals’
involvement (alongside the CIA) in the violence and political tumult in Latin
America’s southern cone. Debate over the power and responsibilities of public
companies was reignited.28
It was in the 1970s that CSR was born as a discrete movement within corporate
law. Its greatest expression was shareholder “social” activism through the corporate
proxy.29 As a matter of law, it was shaped, chiefly, by the SEC’s shareholder proposal
rule, but the SEC did not welcome this creative form of shareholder-based social
activism. Nevertheless, given the Commission’s mandate to act not only to protect
investors but also to act “in the public interest,”30 the SEC could not go too far in
squelching shareholder activism without risking even more vocal backlash. Dr. Leon
Sullivan’s proxy activism connecting corporate leadership issues with equal rights
issues was the most famous example in these early years.31 Such shareholder proxy
activism spurred corporations to increase diversity and limit racial and gender bias in
the workplace. It also spurred social initiatives such as divestment from South Africa
(where apartheid persisted).32
CSR has also pushed in favor of greater attention to institutional integrity and
accountability. The corporate bribery and illegal campaign contribution scandals
mentioned above gave rise to Congress’s enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act of 1977. 33 The Act not only prohibited such bribery, 34 but also raised the
standards for accuracy and reliability in corporate reporting through federal books
28. For evidence within the corporate case law, see Theodora Holding Co. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398,

404 (Del. Ch. 1969) (describing social tensions pushing in the direction of a greater showing of
corporations’ legitimacy).
29. See generally Aaron A. Dhir, Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks: Shareholder Proposals As a Vehicle for

Achieving Corporate Social and Human Rights Accountability, 43 Am. Bus. L.J. 365 (2006) (addressing the
“building blocks” of the allocation of power between shareholders and management); Donald E.
Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 419 (1971)
(offering a general survey of the phenomenon).
30. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2006).
31.

See Dr. Isabella D. Bunn, Global Advocacy for Corporate Accountability: Transatlantic Perspectives from the
NGO Community, 19 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1265 (2004) (illustrating the continued influence of Dr.
Sullivan’s proxy activism).

32.

See Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1129, 1134
(1993) (discussing the development of the shareholder proposal rule); Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder
Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 Ala. L. Rev. 879 (1994) (describing the
history of shareholder activism and setting forth the argument that the SEC’s gatekeeping role over
shareholder proposals was ill conceived).

33.

15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2006).

34. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a) (2006) (setting forth prohibited foreign trade practices by issuers

and domestic concerns).
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and records and internal controls requirements. 35 In 1987, this initiative was
supplemented by the publication of the Committee of Sponsoring Organization’s
influential Treadway Report (“Treadway”), which fleshed out the nature of “good
corporate governance” in terms of internal controls.36 These efforts have been
combined with ongoing securities law reforms, which have raised the standards for
accurate and timely corporate reporting, as expressed recently and most dramatically
in Congress’s enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.37
Social action shareholder proposals are still a significant phenomenon in the
CSR area, though more traditional “shareholder value” related proposals have also
become a constant.38 With respect to the latter, for example, shareholder proposals
calling for the repeal of anti-takeover charter and bylaw provisions have become
commonplace. 39 Furthermore, there is overlap between “social action” and
“shareholder value” proxy proposals, as is evident in recent proposals focusing on
executive compensation.40
C. CSR as a Social Movement and Business Strategy
CSR appears to be gaining traction as a grassroots social movement; hence,
corporations are increasingly sensitive to the need to manage consumer, investor, and
popular concern about CSR issues.41 The growth of ethically motivated investing is

35.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2006).

36. See Report of the Nat’l Comm’n on Fraudulent Fin. Reporting 31–48 (1987); Melvin A.

Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal Control, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 237 (1997).
37.

See discussion infra Part V.B.

38. See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of State, County, and Mun. Employees v. Am. Int’l Group, 462 F.3d 121 (2d Cir.

2006) (involving a shareholder proposal regarding procedural aspects of placing shareholder nominated
candidates on a coporate ballot); Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange
Act Release No. 56,914, 92 SEC Docket 256 (Dec. 6, 2007) [hereinafter Exchange Act Release 56,914]
(the SEC’s most recent pronouncement on shareholder proposals).
39.

See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 833
(2005).

40. See, e.g., “Say on Pay” Shareholder Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation: The New Frontier of Corporate

Governance Activism, M&A Commentary (Latham Watkins, New York, N.Y.) Nov. 2007, available at
http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub2039_1.pdf.
41.

See Kellye Y. Testy, What Is the “New” Corporate Social Responsibility?: Linking Progressive Corporate Law
with Progressive Social Movements, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1227 (2002). In a recent study, consumers favored
support of community philanthropy but cared even more about employee benefits and human rights in
manufacturing, which are core business issues as well as social issues. See Press Release, Cone LLC,
2004 Cone Corporate Citizenship Study Results: Multi-Year Study Finds 21% Increase in Americans
Who Say Corporate Support of Social Issues Is Important in Building Trust (Dec. 8, 2004), available at
http://www.metronewyork.childrensmiraclenetwork.org/radio/radio.php?view=45.
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one example of this increased interest and concern.42 Increased consumer preference
for recyclable products is another example.43
There are many strategies that businesses use to improve their appeal to socially
conscious consumers and investors.44 The most traditional strategy is corporate
donations to nonprofits—commonly known as corporate philanthropy or corporate
charitable giving.45 Corporate philanthropy encompasses not only direct financial
contributions, but also the gifting of products and employee time to nonprofits. As
is true with respect to all forms of corporate civic action, corporate philanthropy
remains controversial. Because there are foreseeable public relations benefits arising
from such donations, some commentators view them as being fundamentally
self-serving—in essence another form of corporate advertising. Furthermore,
corporate giving is still not subject to a comprehensive legal disclosure requirement,
a fact that undermines the legitimacy of this form of corporate civic action.46
Although the motivation for corporate giving will always remain murky, a mandatory
SEC disclosure requirement would go far in promoting the legitimacy of corporate
philanthropy programs. Companies should also be pressed to go on record with the
criteria that govern which gifts they make. Companies that have well run
philanthropy programs will likely continue to garner consumer benefits from them.
A more recent CSR phenomenon is the adoption of Corporate Codes of (Ethical)
Conduct (“Corporate Codes”).47 These Codes address many concerns associated
with CSR, including commitments to accurate reporting; prohibitions on self-dealing
and other unlawful payments; responsibility to workers, communities, and the
42.

See, e.g., Calvert Investments, http://www.calvertgroup.com (last visited Mar. 6, 2009) (providing a
prominent example of a mutual fund family devoted to creating wealth through socially responsible
investing); Social Investment Forum, http://www.socialinvest.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2009)
(maintaining a website functioning as a clearinghouse of information on the subject).

43.

See, e.g., Nat’l Pollution Prevention Ctr., Pollution Prevention in Corporate Strategy
(2005), available at http://www.umich.edu/~nppcpub/resources/compendia/CORPpdfs/CORPcaseA.
pdf (providing a case study assessing McDonald’s commitment to environmentally friendly operations).

44. See John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory Versus Practice in the

Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 Iowa J. Corp. L. 1, 8–23 (2005).
45.

See Curt Weeden, Corporate Social Investing: The Breakthrough Strategy of Giving and
Getting Corporate Contributions 1–11 (1998); Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Philanthropy,
Executives’ Pet Charities and the Agency Problem, 41 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1147, 1153–54 (1997); Kahn,
supra note 22.

46. There have been efforts to adopt such a rule. In 1997, Rep. Paul Gillmor (R-Ohio) proposed two bills

requiring corporate disclosure and shareholder participation in charitable giving. See H.R. 944, 105th
Cong. (1997); H.R. 945, 105th Cong. (1997). Rep. Gillmor introduced a similar bill in 2002 targeting
donations to organizations affiliated with corporate officers and directors. See H.R. 3745, 107th Cong.
(2002). An initial draft of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the House included a disclosure requirement for
a corporation’s charitable gifts and its board members’ charitable organization affiliations, H.R. 3763,
107th Cong. § 7(a)(2) (as passed by House, Apr. 24, 2002), but the adopted legislation failed to do so.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15 &
18 U.S.C.).
47.

See 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (2006).
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environment; and the supervision of supply chains.48 There was a vast movement in
favor of public companies’ adoption of the Corporate Codes in the late 1990s. The
popular phenomenon was given further force by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
which promised lighter penalties if corporate transgressors demonstrated they had
established a bona fide institutional framework for promoting legal compliance.49
Corporate law firms also pushed the adoption of Corporate Codes, as lawyers
increasingly recognized that helping corporations respond to CSR concerns presented
valuable new practice opportunities.50
As is true of corporate philanthropy programs, Corporate Codes of conduct have
proven controversial. It has been difficult to distinguish the lip service paid to ethical
corporate conduct from more genuine, deeply embedded institutional commitments.
But it is clear that consumers’ and investors’ expectations of ethical business conduct
are rising. And it is also clear that these rising expectations are fueling even greater
corporate and academic interest in the subject of CSR. Over time, this increased
attention and analysis should add clarity to what is surface and what goes deeper in
CSR programs.51
Another sign of the growing public, investor, and consumer interest in CSR is
evident in the phenomenon of public companies’ increasingly publishing “social
responsibility reports.” These are typically distributed as part of companies’ annual
communications to shareholders, but it is obvious that they are written with a broader
audience in mind.52 Once again, there is concern that these reports may be superficial
48. See Joshua A. Newberg, Corporate Codes of Ethics, Mandatory Disclosure, and the Market for Ethical

Conduct, 29 Vt. L. Rev. 253 (2005).
49. Melissa Ku & Lee Pepper, Corporate Criminal Liability, 45 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 275, 297 (2008).
50. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism,

Other Ills, 29 J. Corp. L. 267, 285, 311 (2004) (discussing law firms’ stake in helping implement formal
systems to address various risks to the corporation, including reputation and political risk). The
American Bar Association recently created a Committee on Corporate Social Responsibility. The
Committee’s mission statement is illuminating:
The Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Committee is a national leader for attorneys
working in this rapidly growing practice area. The rise of transnational business has
created new challenges for corporations and their counsel. Companies in nearly every
industry—from technology, to apparel, to mining and extractive industries—have come
under scrutiny from governments, human rights groups, and their shareholders as they
navigate the challenges of investing and operating in foreign nations, with vastly different
standards of human rights, environmental protections, and corruption standards that are
expected of them at home. Companies face lawsuits in the U.S. courts for alleged violations
of the Alien Tort Statute and a host of other laws for their conduct abroad. At home,
corporations seek guidance in seeking to remain profitable industry leaders, while fulfilling
their obligations as good corporate citizens.
American Bar Association Section of International Law: Corporate Social Responsibility Committee,
http://www.abanet.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=IC634100 (last visited Mar. 6, 2009).
51.

See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on Corporate Norms,
31 Iowa J. Corp. L. 675, 680 (2006).

52.

Even a cursory Internet search turns up a virtual treasure trove of CSR reports by public companies.
Most companies post these reports on their corporate web pages. See, e.g., Target, Corporate
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public relations campaigns; even worse, they could be intended to smooth over legal
compliance problems or companies’ exploitation of market externalities.
On the bright side, however, even if companies adopt CSR statements and
Corporate Codes for merely defensive or public relations purposes, once progressive
social objectives are codified as part of the corporation’s mission statement, they are
likely to be absorbed more deeply into the company’s culture.53 After publishing
CSR reports or adopting CSR related Corporate Codes or mission statements,
companies have more to lose in terms of consumer and investor good will if they are
exposed as being hypocritical. Employee morale suffers if there is a disconnect
between the company’s stated goals and its actual operations. Such loss of morale
can be costly for organizations. Enhanced political risk is also a factor. If notable
failures are exposed after a company has launched a high profile CSR campaign,
politicians may be more motivated to push for mandatory rules and restrictions. Such
legal rules are likely to be more costly for companies than self-regulation would have
been. In these respects, Corporate Codes and CSR publicity campaigns may gain
more institutional traction than cynics might believe.
The power of the Internet is also driving CSR’s increasing inf luence. The
Internet provides a low cost, highly effective tool for galvanizing consumers’ and
investors’ opinions and helping them to take collective action. The Internet is also
forcing more information relevant to CSR out into public view. In the age of cell
phone cameras, YouTube, and blogging, it is much harder for companies to cover up
accidents and abuses.54 The better run ones situate themselves to be proactive rather
than reactive. The power of the Internet has also reduced corporate senior officers’
ability to hide behind a veil of ignorance. Plausible deniability is less plausible in a
world where information f lows so freely. Accordingly, improved information
technology is promoting more rigorous fiduciary standards of oversight and good
faith in relation to corporate boards and senior executive officers.55
The dynamics of group behavior may also work in favor of CSR. Business
conduct of this kind appears to be highly mimetic (“isomorphic”). Companies often
conform their formal guidelines and Corporate Codes of best practices (and efforts
Responsibility Report (2008), available at http://sites.target.com/site/en/company/page.
jsp?contentId=WCMP04-031084.
53.

See Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said Than Done? A Corporate Law Theory for Actualizing Social Responsibility
Rhetoric, 59 Fla. L. Rev. 771, 786 (2007).

54. See generally Michele Micheletti & Dietlind Stolle, Mobilizing Consumers to Take Responsibility for Global

Social Justice, 611 Annals 157 (discussing how various activist organizations, including “Internet spin
doctors,” have reached consumers and forced socially irresponsible companies (citing specifically
sweatshop targets such as Nike) to alter their conduct).
55.

See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006) (defining the duty of good faith as a component of
the duty of loyalty specifically in the context of a derivative complaint); Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co.,
No. 3176-VCN, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105, at *48 (Del. Ch. July 29, 2008) (discussing duty of care in
the context of approving a merger); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch.
1996) (articulating the standards by which director liability and oversight are measured). For an
excellent analysis of the recent good faith cases, see Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith,
32 Del. J. Corp. L. 719 (2007).
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to adhere to them) to those of their peers or leaders in the industry. Public companies
seem remarkably responsive to the pressure of emerging norms and industry best
practices. This is visible in regard to the adoption of Corporate Codes of ethical
conduct, commitments to sustainability, the observance of labor and employment
standards, and the monitoring of supply chains.56 Even though CSR may only
recently have achieved critical mass, this does not mean that the changes it is
producing will not have staying power.57 As was true in regard to racial and gender
discrimination in the workplace, practices that were once part of the status quo have
become fundamentally unacceptable, through a process of gradual social and
institutional evolution. A growing body of empirical evidence suggests that investors’,
consumers’, and workers’ commitments to CSR are more than mere lip service.58
The election of Barack Obama as America’s forty-fourth president may signal a
tipping point in favor of more social solidarity, and successful corporations will
realize the benefits of promoting this positivity.59
D. CSR and the Regulatory State
In American law, the work of CSR happens in separate, specialized areas of law,
especially in federal regulation. These include regulations governing the workforce
(including health and safety requirements and pension and health care requirements),
environmental regulations, consumer safety regulations, specialized food and drug
safety regulations, regulations protecting investors from fraud, and regulations
requiring accountability regarding corporate lobbying and other corporate political
activity.
The scope of federal (and state) regulations has expanded dramatically over the
past fifty years. Nevertheless, there is widespread concern that the regulations are
not operating to yield greater corporate responsibility and improved social welfare.
The reasons for this gap are too complex to be addressed herein. But it is obvious
that politicians and legislatures have a strong incentive to make promises and even
pass laws that promise broad social welfare reforms, but at the same time have an
56. See generally Stuart Cooper, Corporate Social Performance: A Stakeholder Approach, Corporate Social

Responsibility Series (David Crowther ed., 2004) (discussing what influences societal pressures have
on corporate governance).
57.

See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Is There an Emerging Fiduciary Duty to Consider Human
Rights?, 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 75 (2005).

58. For scholarship demonstrating concern for CSR issues, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, Corporate

Irresponsibility: America’s Newest Export (2001); Michael Bradley et al., The Purposes and
Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroad, 62 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 9 (1999); Claire Moore Dickerson, Human Rights: The Emerging Norm of Corporate
Social Responsibility, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1431 (2002); Claire Moore Dickerson, Transnational Codes of
Conduct Through Dialogue: Leveling the Playing Field for Developing-Country Workers, 53 Fla. L. Rev.
611 (2001); Fairfax, supra note 53; O’Connor-Felman, supra note 10.
59.

Time and again in his inauguration address, the forty-fourth president called for a new embrace of
responsibility in every sector of American society. Inaugural Address, Daily Comp. Pres. Doc.
DCPD200900001 (Jan. 20, 2009).
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incentive to please corporate industry by giving the nod to implementing regulations
that are toothless.
In this vein, Americans have become increasingly worried about the content and
safety of a broad range of products manufactured by multinational corporations.
Laxity, carelessness, and underfunding appear to be significant problems at the
Consumer Products Safety Commission.60 The Food and Drug Administration has
also come under recent fire for inadequately policing the safety of medicines sold by
American pharmaceutical corporations. 61 The quality of OSHA’s oversight of
workplace safety has been subject to increased criticism.62 And despite some increased
rigor on the EPA’s part, industry has succeeded in resisting heightened emissions
controls and more rigorous air pollution limits which would effectively reduce toxic
smog.63 And the SEC appears to have been shockingly slow in responding to signs
of massive investor fraud, as exemplified by the recent multi-billion dollar Madoff
fraud (an estimated $50 billion loss)64 and Stanford fraud (an estimated $8 billion
loss).65 In early February 2009, the head of the SEC’s enforcement division resigned
under heavy criticism.66 In fact, the SEC’s regulatory and oversight failures seem
alarmingly widespread. The Commission itself conceded that its lax oversight
contributed to the recent, grave financial turmoil of 2008–2009.67 This laxity is
evident in the SEC’s waiver of net capital requirements (which had limited the
leverage banks could assume),68 its failure to regulate better credit rating agencies
(whose failed ratings contributed to the recent securitization debacle),69 and shortfalls

60. See Eric Lipton, Safety Agency Faces Scrutiny Amid Changes, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 2007, § 1, at 1. In

2007, Mattel had to recall more than one million toys that had been made in China because they were
covered in lead paint. David Barboza, Why Lead in Toy Paint? It’s Cheaper, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 2007,
at C1.
61.

Gardiner Harris, Study Condemns F.D.A.’s Handling of Drug Safety, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 2006, at A1.

62. See Stephen Labaton, OSHA Leaves Worker Safety Largely in Hands of Industry, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25,

2007, at A1.
63. See Associated Press, E.P.A. Urges Tougher Rules on Smog, N.Y. Times, June 22, 2007, at A14.
64. Alex Berenson & Diana Henriques, S.E.C. Issues Mea Culpa on Madoff, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 2008, at

B1.
65.

On February 17, 2009, the SEC filed civil charges against R. Allen Stanford and three of his companies
in a federal district court in Dallas. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges R. Allen
Stanford, Stanford International Bank for Multi-Billion Dollar Investment Scheme (Feb. 17, 2009),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-26.htm. The SEC itself has gone on record
with the observation that Stanford’s bank promised improbable, if not impossible returns to investors,
which certainly raises questions about why the SEC did not act sooner. Complaint at 2, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n v. Standford Int’l Bank, Ltd., No. 09-CV-00289N (N. Dist. Tex. Feb. 16, 2009).

66. See Gretchen Morgenson, Top Enforcer at the S.E.C. Steps Down, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 2009, at B1.
67.

Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 2008, at A1.

68. See id.
69. See Gretchen Morgenson, Debt Watchdogs: Tamed or Caught Napping?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 2008, at

A1.
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in disclosure requirements, which allowed financial risk-taking and corporate
leverage to spiral out of control.70
Surveying the landscape, it would appear that there are fundamental shortcomings
in the system of regulatory oversight in the United States, and that corporations have
been able to take advantage of these shortfalls in regulation. Perhaps industry has
grown too powerful in influencing regulation and minimizing enforcement. Perhaps
administrative agencies have been inadequately funded, poorly organized, or
complacent. The important point here is that critics of CSR cannot, in good faith,
counter that a corporation’s job is merely to conform to the existing regulations,
because it is apparent that regulations and regulators cannot keep up with corporations
determined to outrun them.
Compared to public companies, government regulators will always be understaffed
and underfunded. Furthermore, companies spend substantial sums to shape the
regulations that will govern them (and their corporate speech is protected by the
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution). Despite the apparent expansion of
federal regulation in the past half century, corporations have carved out room to
maneuver under the rubric of “self regulation.” But this system of industry self
regulation has too often failed. There has been too little corporate transparency and
too much arrogance. (The role of unregulated financial derivatives in the current
financial crisis provides an example of this.) Corporate irresponsibility has been
fostered by agency under-enforcement. The present economic turmoil in the financial
markets, which has triggered a broader and profound economic downturn, reflects
the public’s loss of confidence in corporate America and Wall Street at many levels.
The flight from CSR and responsible regulatory oversight has cost America dearly at
the bottom line, and harmed its reputation in the world.
E. Globalization, CSR, and Contemporary Political Philosophy
As Michael Sandel has observed, although Americans are disinclined to discuss
political philosophy, this does not mean we do not have one.71 Indeed, America’s
embrace of pro-market ideology has played an enormous role in political and economic
affairs domestically and internationally over the past thirty years.72 This is evident
in the triumph of “Reaganomics” in the United States, and our exporting of the
Washington consensus in favor of free market ideology around the globe. This
ideology has been unfavorable to CSR. Even the Supreme Court has often looked
unfavorably upon plaintiffs’ allegations of corporate trespasses against the
70. See Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 2009, § MM (Magazine), at 24. The true

intricacies of quantitative metrics of risk were not made clear to investors; they may not even have been
clear to the financial institutions and investment bankers who relied upon them. Id.
71. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judical Review (1980).
72. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New in Federal

Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1823, 1888–917 (2008) (discussing “market fundamentalism”
and ideological “panmarketry,” along with the impact of globalization, as they relate to the development
of the civil justice system in the United States).
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environment, workers’ and consumer’s rights, and investors’ complaints of fraud and
unfairness.73 Shareholder primacy has been the guiding light in contemporary
corporate law; deregulation has been the mantra in securities law.74 Throughout
these decades, the economy has grown rapidly enough to provide cover for growing
inequality and stagnating wages in the United States. While there have been
downturns in the financial markets and the broader economy, until the most recent
one, they had been relatively brief and mild. In flush times, business regulation has
been tarred as unnecessary.75 In hard times, it has been resisted as too costly or
dangerous to growth. The increasing interest in CSR evident among consumers and
investors may reflect the growing perception that laws and regulations cannot get the
job done without more widespread popular support.
The mobilization of politically conservative think tanks, policy programs, and
academic centers within law schools had fostered this right-leaning momentum that
has prevailed for over twenty-five years.76 The Olin Foundation has had an enormous
influence in moving the private law side of legal education in a conservative direction.
The United States Chamber of Commerce has influenced the composition of the
federal judiciary and even the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court.77
In contrast, within academia, social scientists (sociologists, political scientists,
historians, etc.) whose research would be relevant to CSR issues have remained
largely cut off from one another and from academics at professional schools. They
speak a different language not only from economists,78 but also from corporate law
73. In this period, for example, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has moved staunchly in the direction of

favoring big business. For discussion of the Court’s business-related jurisprudence in this period and
also the role of the United States Chamber of Commerce in mobilizing public and judicial opinion, see
Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 2008, § MM (Magazine), at 38.
74.

See Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 Iowa J.
Corp. L. 637 (2006).

75. The tarring of Sarbanes-Oxley significantly ref lects the post-2002 stock market recovery.

For
commentary on the backlash against Sarbanes-Oxley, see Faith Stevelman, Foreword, Corporate
Governance Five Years After Sarbanes-Oxley: Is There Real Change?, 52 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 475, 480
(2008).

76. See Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine (2007) (providing an extraordinarily well-researched, if

partisan, critique of the influence of the Chicago School on late twentieth century American political
economy and international relations); Michael Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal
Movement (2008) (providing a general account of this trend); Robert C. Ellickson, Symposium on PostChicago Law and Economics: Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors, 65 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 23 (1989) (providing an early critique of the so-called “Law and Economics” school of thought);
George W. Hicks, Jr., The Conservative Influence of the Federalist Society on the Harvard Law School
Student Body, 29 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 623 (2006); Douglass T. Kendall & Eric Sorkin, Nothing for
Free: How Private Judicial Seminars Are Undermining Environmental Protections and Breaking the Public’s
Trust, 25 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 405 (2001) (offering an example of the conservative movement’s
mobilization to influence the judiciary).
77.

See Rosen, supra note 73.

78. For a lucid account of the contemporary concerns of economists that notes the opacity of the field, see

Diane Coyle, The Soulful Science: What Economists Really Do and Why It Matters
(2007).
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and business professors. This is an almost unbelievably strange occurrence.
Presumably it has been driven by the ever increasing technical specialization of
academic research in each of these fields, and the highly competitive nature of
academic progress. Almost all scholars prefer to stay in the established channels,
where they know the waters and can navigate without risk. In this respect, the
tenure system may not be functioning optimally. It protects academics from being
dismissed on account of their views, but it may not be stimulating appropriate crossdisciplinary analysis. Hence, it is likely that the atomization spurred by technical
specialization, along with academics’ fear of intellectual embarrassment, has
dramatically hindered CSR’s development as a field of study. Even in an area like
business and human rights, for example, there has been too little collaboration
between academics and nonprofit leaders in international relations, corporate law,
economics, and sociology. For example, nonprofit leaders have worked tirelessly to
promote transparency regarding multinationals’ payments to foreign governments for
natural resource rights; they can point to the global Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative as evidence of their ongoing success. But their efforts have gone mostly
unnoticed by the corporate law professoriate, which has remained aloof.79
Leaving aside ideology, the limits of sovereignty and unrestrained international
capital flows pose a fundamental challenge to meaningful business regulation in
areas relevant to CSR.80 It has become clear that corporations can reorganize to
exploit the cost advantages of doing business in countries with little or no regulation
of workers’ rights, environmental standards, or enforceable limits on bribery and
corruption.81 In many instances, domestic laws and restrictions do not reach business
conducted abroad. Foreign companies accessing the American capital markets, or
even foreign subsidiaries of U.S. reporting companies, may be able to organize
themselves to avoid SEC disclosure requirements. Only international cooperation
on a vast scale can limit multinational enterprises’ ability to trespass on human rights,
environmental integrity, and rule of law values. We are only beginning to see the
development of international institutions capable of taking on these challenges.
IV. THE CORPORATIONS COURSE

A. The Traditional Course
How does the content of the traditional Corporations course relate to CSR
issues?82 Most professors begin by discussing the mechanics of corporate formation
79. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative: EITI Summary, http://eitransparency.org/eiti/summary

(last visited Mar. 6, 2009); see also testimony infra Appendix A.
80. For an important contribution to the emerging literature on corporate governance and regulatory

arbitrage, see Leo E. Strine, Jr., Human Freedom and Two Friedmen: Musings on the Implications of
Globalization for the Effective Regulation of Corporate Behaviour, 58 U. Toronto L.J. 1710 (2008).
81.

See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, The Social Responsibility of Large Multinational Corporations, 16
Transnat’l Law. 121 (2002).

82. My conclusions are based on a survey of the available casebooks and my conversations with colleagues at

many other law schools.
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and the essential legal attributes of the corporate form of business organization.83 As
for legal attributes, this means centralized decision making in the board. (Typically,
boards delegate ordinary business authority to the senior executive officers.)
Shareholders, and only shareholders, vote in director elections, on bylaw amendments,
and exceptional transactions such as mergers, but on little else. The corporation
enjoys separate legal personhood, which encompasses a presumption that shareholders
will be held harmless for unpaid corporate debts. (This is the concept of the “limited
liability” of corporate shareholders.) Shareholders make a permanent commitment of
equity capital in exchange for their shares, but this illiquidity is offset by their right
to sell or otherwise transfer their shares. The right to receive profits while the
business is ongoing (i.e., dividends) lies solely in the board’s discretion. In a nutshell,
these are the basic legal attributes of the corporate form. Variations are generally
permitted, but at least in larger or public companies they are the exception.
Next, the judicially crafted fiduciary duties applicable to directors, officers, and
controlling shareholders must be added to the picture. With these, the essential
features of the corporate law universe come into view. Yet once fiduciary duties are
added to the mix, even these clear principles yield to greater complexity. The three
basic fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith run to the corporation and the
shareholders only. In the name of promoting director accountability, the courts have
declined to expand these fiduciary duties to bondholders, creditors, or employees.
The force of fiduciary obligation, furthermore, is offset by a compelling respect for
board autonomy in corporate law. Reflecting the preeminent authority afforded
boards in the states’ corporate statutes, the courts have established a so-called
“business judgment rule” (“BJR”). The BJR operates, in effect, as a rule of judicial
abstention. So long as a company’s directors have acted in a passably informed
manner, in good faith, and in the absence of having an immediate self-interest in the
outcome of their decision, the BJR protects them from being second-guessed by
shareholders or the courts.
Hence, the American framework of corporate governance is fundamentally about
the allocation of rights and decision-making authority among a corporation’s board,
officers, and shareholders. Consistent with this focus, in the mainstream account,
corporate law is about reducing the agency costs arising from the separation of
ownership (equity holders) and control (directors and senior officers).84 In colloquial
terms, this means that corporate laws are intended to encourage entrepreneurial,
wealth-enhancing risk taking, while discouraging directors and officers from
83. In a significant number of law schools, the basic Corporations course has been supplanted by a Business

Associations course, which covers partnerships and other business entities as well as corporations.
These courses generally include more discussion of agency law. Once they commence discussion of the
corporate form of business organization, their course work is as described herein. However, there is
some variation in the number of credits allocated to the introductory Corporations or Business
Associations course, and this affects the scope of coverage of the course.
84. In this regard, corporate law has developed not only from the roots established by Berle and Means, see

supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text, but also from economics-oriented scholarship. See Michael
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).
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engaging in secret profit taking. This pattern of corporate law is deemed maximally
efficient—a concept at once breathtakingly powerful and elusive (as described further
below).
Beyond shareholders’ limited voting rights, their powers are mostly restricted
either to selling their shares or suing to enforce fiduciary duties and their basic voting
rights. Of course, shareholders will take a hit in selling their shares once bad news
or underperformance is widely disclosed (which limits the efficacy of selling as a
remedy for mismanagement). Furthermore, corporate law imposes substantial
constraints on shareholder litigation. Shareholders are often deterred from proceeding
not only by virtue of the BJR, but also by the “demand requirement.” The latter
requires plaintiff shareholders to ask the board itself to proceed against the defendant
directors or officers, before proceeding with their claim.85
It is clear that the most influential corporate legal standards are the fiduciary
duties of care, loyalty, and good faith. But it is also obvious that the content and
practical import of these duties is fluid, even opaque at times. First, the duty of care
operates at two distinct dimensions. It has a transactional strain which mandates
that directors inform themselves of all information reasonably available to them prior
to approving a corporate act or transaction.86 Second, due care imports a duty of
oversight that requires the board to implement a reasonably efficacious system of
internal controls sufficient to yield reliable corporate reporting and assess the
company’s success in complying with the law.87 That said, as an enforceable legal
standard, as opposed to an essentially hortatory, normative one, the duty of care is
essentially moribund.88 Charter exculpation provisions, corporate indemnification,
and corporate-funded directors’ and officers’ insurance have generally limited, or
eliminated, the potential for holding these managers personally liable in suits alleging
breach of due care.89
In recent years, some of the most interesting jurisprudential developments have
been in the area of good faith. This duty has been reinvigorated and somewhat
expanded, especially in contrast to the duty of care. Bad faith acts by directors or
officers fall outside charter exculpation provisions, and perhaps also corporate
indemnification and insurance. Hence, the stakes for corporate defendants are much
higher than with shareholder due care claims. Nevertheless, despite the recent
85. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808 (Del. 1984) (holding that “demand can only be excused where

facts are alleged with particularity which creates a reasonable doubt that the directors’ action was
entitled to the protections of the business judgment rule”); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779,
784 (Del. 1981) (finding that a stockholder may retain the right to sue in his derivative action, without
prior demand on the board of directors, only if (s)he can prove that a demand would have been futile).
86. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985).
87.

This duty was first given modern expression in 1996 by the Delaware Chancery Court. See In re
Caremark, 698 A.2d 959.

88. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate

Law, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 437, 464–67 (1993).
89. See E. Norman Veasey, Jesse A. Finkelstein & C. Stephen Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors with a

Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 Bus. Law. 399 (1987).
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judicial attention to the duty of good faith, the chance of directors or officers actually
being held liable in damages for breach of good faith remains remote.90 Good faith
has become significant as a framework for evaluating directors’ conduct in approving
conflicted transactions (for example, executive compensation awards), as well as their
vigor in responding to signs of corporate illegality.91 Nevertheless, state corporate
law has lagged behind federal law in requiring boards to be vigilant regarding the
accuracy of their companies’ public reports.92
The fiduciary duty of loyalty is a more trenchant force in corporate law. Most
fundamentally, it prohibits directors, officers, and controlling shareholders from
engaging in self-dealing transactions that injure the corporation and/or the
shareholders.93 Nevertheless, although fiduciary loyalty is the core of corporate law,
its prohibition on self-dealing is also often unenforceable. If a conflicted transaction
has been ratified by a disinterested majority of shares, or not-too-directly-selfinterested directors,94 the transaction will be largely immune from judicial review.95
A limit on breach of loyalty exculpation via independent ratification exists in
relation to controlling shareholders’ transactions with minority shareholders—for
example, freezeout transactions where the controller acquires the minorities’ shares
for cash. At least in Delaware, these transactions—even seemingly independent
director ratification—only effectuates a shift in the burden of proof. The Delaware
90. For a thoughtful recent proposal advocating reversing allowing full exculpation of duty of care liability

for corporate directors, see Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Stockholder Litigation Under the Delaware General
Corporation Law: Director Inattention and Director Protection Under Delaware General Corporate Law
Section 102(b)(7): A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 33 Del. J. Corp. L. 695 (2008).
91.

This trend was initiated by the seminal case In re Caremark, 698 A.2d 959, and followed in numerous
cases. See, e.g., In re Abbott Labs. Derivative Shareholders Litig., 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003); Stone,
911 A.2d 362 (affirming Caremark as the law of Delaware and elaborating on the link between the duty
of care and the duty of good faith).

92.

From the late 1970s onward, various SEC enforcement actions affirmed directors’ and officers’ roles in
crafting and supervising firms’ public disclosures. See, e.g., Report of Investigation In re Stirling Homex
Corp. Relating to Activities of the Board of Directors of Stirling Homex Corporation, Exchange Act
Release No. 11516 (July 2, 1975); In re the Cooper Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 11,516, 7
SEC Docket 298 (July 2, 1975); Report of Investigation In re the Cooper Companies, Inc. As it Relates
to the Conduct of Cooper’s Board of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 35,082, 58 SEC Docket 591
(Dec. 12, 1994); Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 Concerning the Conduct of Certain Former Officers and Directors of W.R. Grace & Co.,
Exchange Act Release No. 39,157, 65 SEC Docket 1240 (Sept. 30, 1997). For an insightful review of
the accounting and auditing literature elaborating corporate internal control structures and their
incorporation into corporate law standards, see Eisenberg, supra note 88.

93.

See Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341 (Del. Ch. 2007) (providing an evolving interpretation of the duty of
loyalty in the context of the stock options backdating scandals).

94. For discussion of the rise of independent directors in corporate law that seeks to provide a justification

for their role independent of their accountability to shareholders, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of
Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59
Stan. L. Rev. 1465 (2007).
95. See, e.g., Cooke v. Oolie, 23 Del. J. Corp. L. 775 (1998) (Del. Ch. June 23, 1997); see also J. Robert

Brown, Jr., Disloyalty Without Limits: “Independent” Directors and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty,
95 Ky. L.J. 53 (2006) (critiquing the law’s movement in this direction).
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courts have steadfastly applied the rigorous “entire fairness” standard of review to
freezeouts and other self-dealing transactions by controllers—instead of the
deferential BJR standard of review. But once again, even this seemingly hard and
fast principle is not unyielding. The Delaware Chancery Court is attempting to
distinguish the Delaware Supreme Court’s established framework for freezeouts and
is advocating allowing deferential review where a freezeout has been ratified by
disinterested directors or a majority of the (disinterested) minority shareholders.96 In
this shift one can see corporate law’s own infatuation with self-regulation, as was
discussed earlier in regard to federal regulation.97
Most introductory courses include some discussion of the basic rules and standards
applied to mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) transactions. Notwithstanding a
panoply of relevant federal securities laws and regulations, corporate fiduciary
standards—i.e., variations on the same duties of care, loyalty, and good faith—are
often the most trenchant ones in these transactions. These fiduciary standards often
have dispositive importance in affecting the outcomes of these transactions, especially
where the relief sought is additional disclosure or an injunction stopping the deal’s
progress (as is often the case).98 In this respect Delaware’s rich M&A case law
provides deal planners and principals a detailed “transactional choreography”: a trove
of best practices relevant to the conduct of boards, officers, controlling shareholders,
investment bankers, and corporate general counsel.99
B. Going One Step Further to Discuss CSR Concerns
1. CSR, Director Primacy, and the Limits of Shareholder Voting
Shareholder voting provides one framework for considering the pervasive
ambiguity in corporate law. First there is the curiosity of who does and does not
have a right to vote in corporate law. As stated earlier, it is only shareholders who
have voting rights in the election of directors. When it comes to fundamental
transactions, the states’ statutes vary on whether holders of preferred stock have
distinct class voting rights. Delaware is sufficiently “deal loving” that its corporate
code does not provide for a separate class voting right for holders of preferred stock,
96. For a review of the entire fairness standard and an argument against applying the BJR to going private

transactions (except where there has been a genuine market check or auction of the company as a going
concern), see Faith Stevelman, Going Private at the Intersection of the Market and the Law, 62 Bus. Law.
775 (2007).
97.

The SEC’s “pulling” the net capital rule for the five largest investment banks provides a recent glaring
example. See Stephen Labaton, Agency’s ’04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and Risk, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 3, 2008, at A23. The FASB’s allowing Enron to determine its own valuations for many of its most
important contracts was another experiment gone awry. See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bombing Markets,
Subverting the Rule of Law: Enron, Financial Fraud, and September 11, 2001, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1579, 1589
n.28 (2002).

98. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-

Oriented Class Actions, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 133 (2004) (providing a discussion of the high proportion of
investor class actions in M&A transactions, as a proportion of the Court of Chancery’s docket).
99. For elaboration of the concept of “transactional choreography,” see Stevelman, supra note 96.
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even when the transaction could disadvantage the preferred holders financially.100
Debenture holders possessing rights to convert to equity are held to have no voting
rights prior to conversion.101 Even though bondholders commonly provide long term
capital to the enterprise, corporate law affords them neither voting rights nor fiduciary
duties. They are relegated to protecting themselves, where possible, through their
indenture contracts. Corporate law also contemplates no voting rights for employees,
even where layoffs are a probable outcome of a merger or sale of substantially all
assets—notwithstanding that employees make firm-specific investments of human
capital.
The narrow scope of these voting rights is not easy to explain. Perhaps it reflects
the outdated notion that (only) holders of common stock are the owners of the
firm—a concept that was problematic by the time of Berle and Means’s The Modern
Corporation and Private Property.102 Perhaps the narrow scope of voting in corporate
law reflects the equally contestable notion that as the residual claimants, shareholders’
interests operate as a surrogate for all stakeholders’ best interests—corporate law’s
version of trickle down economics. Perhaps it reflects the successful domination of
labor by capital, consistent with the basic pattern of capitalism. And Delaware’s
failure to afford class voting rights to holders of preferred stock, even in recapitalization
mergers that might compromise the preferred shareholders’ interests, ref lects
Delaware corporate law’s zeal for corporate transactions.103
Even if one accepts the restrictions in the scope of voting rights described above,
there are basic problems even in the matter of common shareholders’ voting for directors.
State corporate law stops short of supporting a system that would fully enfranchise
shareholders. This is evident in the fact that shareholders have no right to have a say
in who will be nominated for election to the board. The task of nominating the next
slate of directors is delegated to the sitting board. If the shareholders wish to
nominate a separate slate then, consistent with the SEC’s proxy rules, they must bear
the considerable expense and risk of mounting a separate proxy solicitation,
distributing it to their cohorts, and filing it with the SEC.104 Second, state corporate
law provides little room for insurgent shareholders to be reimbursed for their efforts
in mounting a separate slate in a director election (whereas the sitting board’s slate,
which will be voted on via the corporate proxy, is funded by the corporation).105
100. See, e.g., VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005) (discussing

the absence of a class voting requirement in recapitalization mergers in Delaware and providing a
discussion of California’s alternative scheme).
101. See Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 302 (Del. 1988).
102. Berle & Means, supra note 25.
103. See, e.g., In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 624 (Del. Ch. 2005). The court

expressed its zeal in supporting corporate transactions by presuming that freezeout transactions
contribute to economic efficiency and the creation of wealth, without adequately taking into account the
potential unfairness to minority shareholders. See id.
104. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Proxy Contests in an Era of Increasing Shareholder Power: Forget Issuer Proxy Access

and Focus on E-Proxy, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 475, 479 (2008).
105. Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 173 (1955).
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Hence, outside of contests for control in takeovers, the (non)reimbursement rule
enshrined in corporate law strongly inhibits real director elections.106 The net result
is that although it is axiomatic in corporate law that boards are elected by shareholders,
it is more realistic to think of the incumbents as selecting their successors.107
In this regard, corporate law has radically reinforced the status quo of clubby,
demographically homogeneous boards—a reality which has contributed to the
detrimental impact of “group think.” This is more troublesome still because modern
corporate law is praised as enabling shareholder choice. Clearly this enabling of
shareholder choice does not encompass enabling shareholders to have a meaningful
role in nominating directors for election, hence voting for directors of their own
choosing.
From the above discussion it might seem that enhancing the shareholder franchise
would produce better, more accountable, less despotic corporate enterprises. Yet, for
proponents of director primacy, a more robust shareholder franchise would limit the
board’s compass to run the company in the interest of the broader range of corporate
constituencies: shareholders and non-shareholders. These commentators criticize
reforms that would give more control to shareholders in director elections. They see
such reforms as threatening the corporation’s best interests and capacity to produce
maximum returns beneficial to all.108 The competing claims of “shareholder primacy”
and “director primacy” go back to the early beginnings of corporate law. For example,
they are evident in a series of essays exchanged between Adolph Berle and E. Merrick
Dodd in the 1930s.109 At times the proponents of shareholder primacy recast their
claims as being stakeholder neutral, on the rationale that shareholders (as residual
claimants) cannot be enriched before third-party claims have been satisfied.110 The
106. See Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees Pension Plan, 462 F.3d 121 (describing the SEC’s

recommended changes to the shareholder nomination process in relation to the use of the corporate
proxy statement); Exchange Act Release 56,914, supra note 38.
107. See generally Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding that a board of

directors may not take unilateral action to impede shareholder voting without a compelling justification
for such action).
108. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U.

L. Rev. 547 (2003); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
Va. L. Rev. 247 (1999).
109. Compare A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers Held in Trust, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 (1931) (arguing

that corporations exist to increase shareholder wealth), with E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are
Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145, 1147–48 (1932) (arguing that the corporation
owes responsibilities to all corporate constituents and to society as a whole).
110. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94

Colum. L. Rev. 124, 125 n.2 (1994) (“This illustrates the point that the maximization of social welfare
is not necessarily inconsistent with using the shareholder wealth maximization criterion as the lodestar
for corporate governance. Indeed, the ultimate defense of the shareholder wealth criterion must be cast
in social welfare terms: that the sum of payouts by the firm—wages, supplier payments, dividends,
interest, and taxes—will be maximized by a system that assigns the residual claim to shareholders and
empowers them to select managers who will act responsively. This is not an uncomplicated point,
however, since good management of a declining firm may decide, for example, that plant closings and
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opposing camp sees shareholder primacy as unfairly and arbitrarily privileging the
providers of equity capital.
As a matter of positive law, the present model of corporate governance validates
board primacy—it gives boards enough re-electability and discretion in the exercise
of their office to make decisions that balance the interests of shareholders with those
of extra-shareholder constituencies. In the dialectic of one-dimensional shareholder
interests and unaccountable boards, director primacy has the better claims;
nevertheless, in its naked form the dialectic is a tired one. Real progress in corporate
governance will come when corporate leaders and their counsel embrace a new
paradigm of economics in which scarcity takes into account human beings’ brief time
on the planet, the claims of later generations, and the problem of nonrenewable
resources. In this regard, the burgeoning literature on sustainability offers new
promise to corporate governance and professors seeking new paths in teaching it.
2. The Limited Liability of Corporate Shareholders
Another area of the Corporations course that can serve as a platform for discussing
the CSR issue is the limited liability of corporate shareholders. A central tenet of
corporate law is that only the firm itself is responsible for its obligations. This is true
not only with respect to a company’s contractual obligations, but also for tort damages.
The fact that tort victims—such as the employees and local citizens in Libby,
Montana, devastated by Grace’s wanton mishandling of asbestos—can be left
uncompensated through the corporate bankruptcy process is a remarkably socially
salient feature of contemporary corporate law.111
The limited liability of corporate shareholders is valorized as a major driver of
wealth creation. Judges Easterbrook and Fischel have argued that in public companies
limited liability is essential to the uniform pricing of corporate shares, which
facilitates trading and hence efficient investor diversification.112 Nevertheless, a
scheme of proportionate liability could be adopted that would be compatible with
uniform pricing, broad liquidity, and the creation of wealth by public companies. In
addition, the “market trading” rationale is irrelevant to shareholders in closely held
firms, even though limited liability is still the rule in closely held firms. The rationale
in this setting is that limiting shareholders’ liability (to the capital they have in the
corporation) facilitates entrepreneurship through the creation of small businesses.
The famous case of Walkovsky v. Carlton illustrates the CSR concerns raised by
the limited liability of corporate shareholders.113 The defendant in the case was a
natural person who established a taxi cab enterprise with ten corporations each
other disruptions are necessary.” (citing Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 Colum.
L. Rev. 1931, 1953–54 (1991))).
111. See, e.g., Anita Huslin, W.R. Grace to Settle Asbestos Claims for $1.8 Billion, Start New Chapter, Wash.

Post, Apr. 8, 2008, at D01.
112. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law

41–44 (1991).
113. Walkovsky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 416 (1966).
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owning two cabs and possessing $10,000 worth of liability insurance (the legally
acceptable minimum for a taxi cab company at the time). By dividing the tiny equity
capital he had into ten separate corporations, the defendant, Mr. Carlton, achieved
the maximum degree of bankruptcy remoteness for his personal wealth. (Public
companies mirror this strategy in setting up many series of subsidiaries and
subsidiaries of subsidiaries.) Apparently, even at that time, $10,000 worth of
insurance was clearly an insufficient amount to cover foreseeable injuries and damages
that would arise in the course of the taxis’ operation. Nevertheless the court claimed
that the plaintiff had presented no reason to depart from the rule of limited liability,
because Carlton had done nothing wrong in dividing his enterprise into separate,
liability-remote bits.114
To understand the implications of shareholders’ limited liability, more context is
required. First, there is no minimum capital requirement in setting up a corporation.
Second, corporate dividend laws and fraudulent conveyance laws are almost entirely
ineffective in keeping capital within a corporation, even where the company has
earned profits. Nor can tort victims look to national health insurance if they are
injured by a corporation that has declared bankruptcy. Creditors and tort victims
can appeal to courts and ask them to pierce the corporate veil where the shareholders
have committed some kind of fraud, but piercing is the rare exception. These legal
rules all need to be factored into the analysis of limited shareholder liability because
they each contribute to a shortfall in corporate accountability for consumer injuries,
environmental hazards, and mass torts.115
Indeed, after fifteen years of reflecting on cases in which the courts are called
upon to pierce the corporate veil, I can find little depth of legal reasoning in them,
beyond the policy goals of incentivizing capital formation and encouraging investment
in the corporate form. In essence, the legal rule quite nakedly embraces a policy
judgment that even tort creditors’ claims will be subordinated to those goals. There
appears to be no deeper intellectual coherence in the limited liability case law. The
fact that corporate law privileges the goal of capital formation over the compensation
of tort victims is certainly a topic of social relevance.116
3. CSR, Regulatory Competition, and “Efficient” Corporate Laws
The open-ended, enabling nature of the states’ corporate statutes and the loose
enforcement of fiduciary constraints have been justified as being maximally efficient.
This rationale permeates the corporate case law and academic commentary, although
few texts or authorities explain what is meant by “efficient.” The basic notion seems
to be most conducive to profit maximization, without regard to distributional effects
114. Id. at 421.
115. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 58, at 53–54, 98, 182.
116. See Theresa Gabaldon, Experiencing Limited Liability: On Insularity and Inbreeding in Corporate Law, in

Progressive Corporate Law 111 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); Theresa A. Gabaldon, The
Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other Reflections on the Limited Liability of Corporate Shareholders, 45
Vand. L. Rev. 1387, 1413 (1992).
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(that is, issues of inequality). In this regard, CSR discourse runs counter to the
mainstream, efficiency rationales of corporate law, because the former presumes that
increasing inequality is inherently problematic, and the latter does not.
But even accepting the growth-above-all rationale, it is not clear whether
corporate law is efficient. The debate is a very longstanding one in the corporate law
literature. The earliest claim, as presented by Professor William Carey, was for the
inefficiency of corporate law. Writing in the mid-70s, Carey found ample room in
the structure of Delaware law to condemn the lax, modern, enabling approach as
destructive of wealth.117 For example, in these years there were many high-profile
examples of controlling shareholders taking firms public at high valuations and then
quickly buying back the shares as the market prices dropped dramatically. Carey and
other scholars decried the phenomenon as exemplary of corporate law’s excessive
permissiveness. Widespread dissatisfaction with Delaware’s laxity even provoked the
SEC to respond. The Commission proposed, but then backed off from, a substantive
fairness requirement for these transactions.118 In sum, Carey initiated the “race for
the bottom” critique of modern corporate law’s laxness and inefficiency.
As contemporary market theory was brought to bear on corporate law concepts,
the “race for the bottom” view was countered by a “race to the top” counterpart. The
latter was articulated most famously by Ralph Winter.119 “Race to the top” theorists
believe that the capital markets punish firms operating in suboptimal (inefficient)
governance regimes. Because the states benefit from chartering, they can be expected
to compete to offer more efficient corporate laws. In this account, Delaware corporate
law is the winner because its law is maximally productive of corporate wealth.
Much is at stake for CSR in this debate. If state corporate law panders to
managers’ self-interest, and undermines broader wealth creation, then the entire
corporate legal apparatus is subject to indictment and should be reformed. In the
alternative, if state corporate law is honed by efficient capital market forces, then
regulatory tampering may destroy financial wealth and potentially lead to a poorer
society. For decades this debate has been ongoing, with evidence being marshaled
on both sides.
But recently the polemic has taken a different turn. Professor Mark Roe, an
expert on political economy, has argued persuasively that the persistent threat of
federal disfavor or even preemption has prevented anything like a persistent movement
towards efficient state corporate laws.120 According to Roe, the pattern of state
corporate laws that has emerged is indeterminate from an efficiency perspective.
In sum, efficiency claims for the status quo in corporate legal regulation are
eroding. The more recent accounts present a portrait of corporate law that is
117. See William L. Carey, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663 (1974).
118. See Stevelman, supra note 96, at 795–97 (discussing the dual regulation of going private transactions and

the origins of the SEC’s rule 13e-3A).
119. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal

Stud. 251, 254–62 (1977).
120. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 588 (2003).
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fundamentally path dependent, i.e., historically embedded and the product of enabled
interest groups.121
V. THE SECURITIES REGULATION COURSE

A. The Traditional Course
Traditionally, the Securities Regulation course first focuses on the legal
requirements attaching to companies’ raising capital in public sales and/or private
placements of securities. The aforesaid transactions are governed principally by the
Securities Act of 1933 (“the ’33 Act”).122 The theme of supporting investors’ trust
through disclosure is amplified as the course turns to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (“the ’34 Act”). The ’34 Act governs disclosure to investors in connection with
tender offers and proxy voting (that is, shareholder voting for directors and in
fundamental transactions like mergers). It also establishes a system of periodic,
calendar-driven reporting, and the disclosure of specified unusual events on Form
8-K.123 All of these disclosure mandates are matched by prohibitions on material
misstatements or omissions. The antifraud prohibitions, including those arising
under the ’33 Act, may be enforceable either through private litigation, SEC
enforcement, or criminal enforcement by the Department of Justice—or some
combination of them. The ’34 Act reaches more broadly into various forms of
investor protection and market regulation. It provides for the creation of the SEC,
the regulation of the securities exchanges, and the regulation of broker dealers, for
example.
A novice encountering these two principal securities acts would assume that they
reflected the legal status quo of 1933 and 1934, but the opposite is true. Congress is
constantly amending, supplementing, and partially repealing the terms of these acts.
The same is true of the implementing regulations promulgated by the SEC. Given
the dynamic nature of the financial markets, the changing needs of investors, as well
as the accretion of historic layers of law and regulation, the result is nearly unintelligible
to novices. This is a fundamental challenge in the teaching of Securities Regulation,
one that becomes more formidable every year. For example, at present—in the spring
of 2009—there are calls for a complete overhaul of financial regulation. Persistent
121. For commentary on the indeterminacy of the empirical evidence on corporate law’s efficiency, see

William J. Carney and George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success, 2009 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 1, 9–11 (collecting and analyzing decades of empirical studies about efficiency effects from
Delaware chartering and concluding that “[t]he results of over twenty-five years of empirical work thus
remain inconclusive”); Michal Barzuza, Price Considerations in the Market for Corporate Law, 26
Cardozo L. Rev. 127, 129 (2004) (presenting evidence for and theories of efficiency in corporate law
and concluding that “[n]otwithstanding the extensive theoretical and empirical literature on this
question, there is no consensus as to the desirability of the current system”); Guhan Subramanian, The
Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover
Overreaching, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1795 (2002) (finding mixed empirical data in study of whether
corporate managers migrate to or away from states with strong anti-takeover laws).
122. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006).
123. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2006).
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tinkering and periodic overhaul is the norm in the securities regulation area, just as
it is in relation to the federal income tax code.
The dense statutory language and complex and oblique cross-referencing between
the statutes and regulations make the Securities Regulation course exceptionally
challenging. In addition, students need to conceptualize their future work as lawyers
in terms of both counseling (for example, in helping companies raise funding in
securities offerings) and litigation strategy (for example, in bringing or defending
against claims of securities fraud). As is true in Corporations, the scope and
complexity of the subject matter in the Securities Regulation course poses a
fundamental challenge to students developing a comfort level with the material; this
complexity threatens to crowd out discussion of broader themes and policy matters.
For example, the answer to a seemingly straightforward question like whether the
SEC is a credible monitor of fraud becomes shockingly elusive, and it is almost
impossible to lead a discussion of the issue based on the materials in the standard
casebooks and statutory supplements. But without these broader issues, the course is
almost intolerably dry and intellectually barren. More thoughtful students would be
driven elsewhere in the curriculum.
B. Using Sarbanes-Oxley to Ask Broader Questions
So much has been written about the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX” or the
“Act”), that I will not attempt to discuss its individual provisions here.124 SOX was
aimed, most fundamentally, at restoring investors’ and the public’s trust in the systems
of corporate auditing and financial reporting. The financial frauds exposed in the
months and years after Enron’s collapse triggered deep concern about the integrity of
corporate governance and financial regulation in the United States.125 Of course this
is the most elementary of CSR challenges.
SOX includes wide ranging investor protections but departs from a narrow
understanding of shareholder profit maximization. Many of the Act’s provisions are
not justifiable based on short term shareholder profit maximization.126 SOX’s aims

124. For discussion of SOX, its accomplishments, and its limitations and citation to the literature, see

Stevelman, supra note 75.
125. See Kahn, supra note 97 (providing a discussion of the market and social conditions concurrent with

SOX’s enactment); Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 1233 (2003) (focusing on the structure of Enron’s board of directors to discuss the broader theme
of corporate culture).
126. The greatest backlash to SOX has surrounded the expense associated with section 404 compliance.

Section 404 requires that an issuer’s annual report include a report by management on internal controls,
including: (i) a statement of management’s responsibility for establishing and maintaining adequate
internal controls over financial reporting; (ii) a statement identifying the framework used by management
to evaluate the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting; (iii) management’s assessment
of the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting as of the end of the most recent fiscal
year; and (iv) a statement that the company’s auditor has issued an attestation report on the management’s
assessment of the internal controls over financial reporting. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §
7762 (2006).
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are broader: it targets the essential framework supporting investors’ trust in investing
in U.S. publicly traded corporations and Wall Street.
In this sense, SOX represents securities law enacted in the public interest. Greater
coherence in regard to valuation, enhanced transparency, and heightened managerial
accountability may not produce immediately quarterly gains, but they portend longer
term benefits both to investors and all the constituencies dependent on the sustained
health of Main Street and Wall Street.127 This is one reason why shareholder
advocates and business law professors accustomed to thinking in terms of shareholder
primacy and shareholder profit maximization have characteristically been critical of
the Act.128 The longer-term benefits of better auditing and enhanced trust may be
too difficult to measure, whereas the costs of implementing new regulations are
apparent. Still, there is reason to believe that SOX’s new, heightened standards for
internal controls will yield greater shareholder value. After all, how can corporations
achieve optimal productivity if they cannot measure their inventory, costs, revenues,
profits, risk exposure, and legal compliance with speed and accuracy?129 Hence,
SOX’s emphasis on improvements in internal controls is likely to generate core
efficiency benefits for shareholders over the longer term. Companies and their
advisers probably will need time to learn to leverage the investment in information
technology, which was hastened by new laws and regulations.130

127. It is not the first time that Congress has signaled the need for securities laws and market regulations “in

the public interest.” In the Securities and Exchange Act, for example, Congress grants the SEC
authority to promulgate disclosure provisions and other rules “in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.” Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2006). For the argument that SOX
responded to a crisis of both governmental and extra governmental (i.e., corporate) legitimacy, see Cary
Coglianese, Legitimacy and Corporate Governance, 32 Del. J. Corp. L. 159 (2007); Kahn, supra note
97.
128. But see John C. Coates IV, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21 J. Econ. Persp. 91 (2007);

James Fanto, A Social Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 52 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 517, 522–25 (2008) (discussing
the legal and business community’s reception of the Act); Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction
of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1817 (2007).
129. See Gordon, supra note 94 (arguing that stock prices—assumedly as the result of accurate information

disclosed to the market—yield absolutely crucial information relevant to managerial decision-making).
130. For a pre-SOX analysis of the value added by corporate and securities laws’ focus on boards’ oversight of

internal controls and systems of information technology, see Faith Stevelman Kahn, Transparency and
Accountability, Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Law’s Relevance to Corporate Disclosure, 34 Ga. L. Rev.
505, 507 (2000) (“[T]he doctrines of fiduciary care and loyalty are both concerned fundamentally with
directors’ and officers’ stewardship over their firms’ information. These doctrines obligate managers to
oversee the gathering, internal and public reporting, and the ‘deployment’ of corporate information
consistent with their firms’ and their shareholders’ best interests.”); id. at 510 (“The production of high
quality data and the ability to organize and present such data accurately and coherently to the relevant
corporate decisionmakers is essential to promoting optimal decisionmaking and, thus, value creation in
the firm’s and its shareholders’ best interests.”).
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Also promoting CSR, SOX enacts anti-corruption and heightened ethics
standards for auditors131 and auditing firms,132 corporate boards and audit
committees,133 CEOs and CFOs,134 and corporate general counsel.135 The Act’s
most sweeping innovation is the creation the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (subject to the SEC’s authority), which is intended to be more independent of
industry in its oversight of public company auditing practices.136 In this respect SOX
represents a partial rejection of the paradigm of industry self regulation that has
facilitated destructive corporate conduct in recent years.137
SOX has been controversial, also, because in enacting the federal securities laws,
Congress has generally sought to avoid trespassing in areas of corporate governance
identified with state law.138 These areas include, for example, the regulation of
131. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(j) (2006) (requiring audit partner rotation every five

years).
132. Id. § 7212 (requiring accounting firms that audit public companies to register with the Public Company

Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”)); see also id. § 7211(c) (authorizing the PCAOB to set
standards for public company audits and to enforce auditing rules for such firms).
133. See id. § 78j-l(m) (requiring that audit committee members be independent directors; requiring that

audit committee have direct responsibility for appointment, compensation and oversight of the firm’s
public auditor and requiring company to indicate whether at least one member of the audit committee
meets the standard of being a “financial expert”).
134. Id. § 7241(a) (requiring the CEO and CFO to certify the accuracy and completeness of their company’s

publicly filed financial statements in annual and quarterly reports, as well as the absence of known
deficiencies in the company’s systems of internal control); see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Form over Substance?:
Officer Certification and the Promise of Enhanced Personal Accountability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55
Rutgers L. Rev. 1 (2002).
135. Id. § 7245 (requiring the SEC to promulgate minimum standards of professional responsibility for

attorneys appearing before it and to require such attorneys to report to the company’s senior-most body
evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty); see also Peter Kostant, From
Lapdog to Watchdog: Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307 and a New Role for Corporate Lawyers, 52 N.Y.L. Sch. L.
Rev. 535, 548–49 (2008) (“Sarbanes-Oxley is important as a social response to the overreaching and
greed of corporate executives and financiers . . . . [M]y focus has long been on changing the culture of
corporate lawyering, which section 307 has begun to accomplish.”); Giovanni Prezioso, Fiana Kwasnik
& Lee S. Richards III, Obligations and Liabilities of Attorneys Representing U.S. Public Companies: Trends
and Developments, 1691 PLI/Corp 329 (2008) (providing practitioners’ perspectives, regarding the
developing federal requirements relevant to an attorney’s representation of public companies).
136. Id. § 7211 (replacing the existing system of self-regulation with a new body responsible for overseeing

public company auditing, publicizing auditing standards, and investigating and disciplining
noncompliant auditing firms). The private, nonprofit status of the PCAOB is a legal curiosity and was
recently challenged as being unconstitutional. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Is the PCAOB Unconstitutional?,
235 N.Y. L.J. 5 (2006); Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its
Public/Private Status, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 975 (2005).
137. For an account of how faith in “self regulation” on the part of the SEC contributed to deregulation and,

ultimately, the major investment houses’ massive losses from investments in mortgage backed securities,
see Labaton, supra note 97.
138. See, e.g., Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A

Morality Tale for Policymakers Too, 22 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 251 (2005); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock,
Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1573 (2005); Robert B.
Thompson, Corporate Governance After Enron, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 99 (2003).
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boards, general counsel, internal reporting lines, and the responsibilities of CEOs
and CFOs to shareholders. In one of its more innovative strokes, SOX established
bright line responsibilities for corporate general counsel and, in effect, elevated the
general counsel’s stature to its rightful place among corporate senior officers. In so
doing, Congress signaled that legal compliance must be a first-order consideration in
corporate strategy. In a similar vein, SOX gave the audit committee clear, front-line
responsibility for monitoring the quality of corporate disclosures. In SOX, Congress
also sought to reduce unseemly conflicts of interest on the part of corporate senior
executives and, in so doing, has reinforced state corporate law’s duty of loyalty.139 In
sum, in expanding the role of federal mandatory standards in corporate governance,
and in promoting transparency and accountability, SOX is a congressional expression
of CSR concerns.140
This is not to suggest that SOX is flawless; indeed there are individual provisions
in the Act that are readily susceptible to criticism. Ultimately, SOX’s influence—its
success or failure (as really is always true in law)—will depend on the spirit in which
it is received by business leaders, their legal counsel, financial advisers, and auditors,
as well as the broader community of popular opinion. Will they carp on the Act’s
shortcomings or accept it, despite its flaws, as an opportunity to promote greater
corporate integrity, transparency, and accountability?141 Business law professors are
positioned to be influential in this respect. We educate the community of future
corporate lawyers—lawyers who will shape norms in the corporate environment. If
business law professors adopt a disparaging attitude towards law and regulation,
business leaders can hardly be expected to rise to the challenge of conforming to the
best spirit of the law.
Another word on the present financial crisis is warranted. The current financial
crisis has illuminated the interconnectedness of markets and economies, in the United
States and globally. Unchecked greed and arrogance erode the basic framework of
financial transacting, the provision of services and manufacturing, and also the
broader social structure. The financial, economic, and social structures that make
up civil society are inextricably linked, as CSR studies recognize. Meaningfully
stringent, enforceable investor protections promote trust and integrity in financial
139. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7244 (2006) (preventing insider trades during

blackout periods); id. § 78m (prohibiting loans or extensions of credit to directors or officers); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1514A (2006) (creating whistleblower protection for employees).
140. In a recent New York Times article, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox described the Commission’s

reliance on investment banks’ self-regulation as a failure. See Labaton, supra note 97 (“The last six
months have made it abundantly clear that voluntary regulation does not work.”). To be fair, there is
criticism that self-regulation has fostered the politicization of corporate governance. See, e.g., Steven A.
Ramirez, The Special Interest Race to CEO Primacy and the End of Corporate Governance Law, 32 Del. J.
Corp. L. 345 (2007).
141. See Lynne L. Dallas, Enron and Ethical Corporate Climates, in Enron: Corporate Fiascoes and Their

Implications 187, 201–06 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) (providing an insightful
analysis of the relationship between law and corporate ethics); Langevoort, supra note 128; Cheryl L.
Wade, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Ethical Corporate Climates: What the Media Reports; What the General
Public Knows, 2 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 421 (2008) (discussing the reception of SOX).
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markets and institutions; hence they are likely to make a positive contribution to
other institutions of civil society.
VI. CORPORATE TRANSPARENCY AS A UNIFYING THEME

In the mid-1990s, when I first began to study the scope and practice of mandatory
corporate reporting, the term “corporate transparency” was not in use. Even the core
presumption inherent in the term corporate transparency was not conventionally
accepted. State corporate law was inexact, at best, in requiring companies to report
to their shareholders. Public companies made the reports required by federal law at
the times required by federal law. In closely held firms, shareholders were relegated
to negotiating for disclosure of corporate information. The scope of public company
reporting was driven by the SEC’s line item provisions in Regulation S-K and the
requirement that what companies did report could not be materially misleading or
incomplete. SEC reporting was merely another form of legal compliance. It was not
conceived of as an ethical expectation or norm implicating broader institutional
values. Corporations owned their information, and like the firm itself that
information was conceived of as being essentially private.
My writing, along with some other legal scholars’, criticized the narrowness and
normative (politically conservative) bias in the SEC’s disclosure requirements
implemented through Regulation S-K.142 As part of this, we criticized the contours
of the reasonable investor—who, as reflected in the SEC’s reporting system—cared
little or nothing about corporate conduct that did not impact the corporation’s
immediate bottom line.143
In an article published in 1997, I highlighted the absence of required disclosure
regarding corporate charitable contributions—especially the problematic features of
donations to politically active nonprofits intent on moving law and policy in a
conservative direction.144 In a separate article, I focused more broadly on the SEC’s
minimal interest in corporate disclosure of socially significant information, including
corporate disclosures relevant to companies’ environmental impact, their treatment
of employees, and expenditures on lobbying and politically significant litigation.145
To this day, the SEC’s scheme of mandatory reporting allows companies to omit
most of the information about its political and charitable expenditures and its
compliance history regarding workers’ safety, consumer safety, and adherence to

142. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, The Unjustified Absence of Federal Fraud Protection in the Labor Market, 107

Yale L.J. 715 (1997); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197 (1998).
143. This may be changing gradually in response to the SEC’s development of the concept of qualitative

materiality. See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45150 (1999) (requiring
consideration of disclosure of information that affects compliance with regulatory requirements even if
it does not meet a five percent of earnings or revenues test).
144. See Kahn, supra note 22.
145. See Kahn, supra note 21, at 1132–45.
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environmental standards.146 In most instances, only if gross problems develop in
these areas, or if the problems yield large-scale litigation or penalties, is disclosure
required.
The intellectual history of the concept and expectation of corporate transparency
remains to be written. But it is clear that the term corporate transparency and the
broad concerns it implies were imported from discussions of international law and
the efforts of nongovernmental organizations in achieving greater clarity about the
conduct of international bodies. It is also clear that there has been a paradigm shift
in domestic expectations regarding corporate reporting—one which favors
corporations’ making fuller disclosure of their socially-salient conduct. Scholars of
international law and activists in the field had to accommodate themselves to the
gaps in regulation arising from the limits of state sovereignty—limits which have
grown more salient and significant to the conduct of multinational corporations. In
the international arena, pressure was earlier brought to bear on promoting disclosure,
based on the perceived necessity of stemming corruption and promoting economic
development. As the pace of global financial transacting has accelerated, so too have
concerns about corporate and financial transparency. Hence these concerns are
receiving greater attention in American corporate and securities law.
The SEC would have preferred otherwise based on its history, but the public
reports and filings mandated by the SEC are becoming the accepted vehicle for
expanding corporate transparency. This is true in regard to financial, operating,
legal, and governance-related corporate information—and increasingly CSR-related
information. Indeed, the continuum between socially significant and economically
significant corporate conduct is becoming more obvious and widely accepted.
Leaving aside voluntary, hence inevitably selective reporting on companies’ websites
and in social responsibility reports, SEC-mandated corporate reports are increasingly
becoming a primary information resource for employees, creditors, regulators, the
media, corporate consultants (such as RiskMetrics), and nongovernmental
organizations. Based on past practice, the SEC would have preferred to define its
disclosure mandate more narrowly. But its framework for corporate reporting is
expanding investors and activists, and companies themselves, increasingly appreciate
the link between profitability and CSR concerns.
In just this vein, there are several, ongoing legislative initiatives to expand socially
relevant corporate disclosure. For example, both the House Financial Services
Committee and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
have been working on bills that would require multinational corporations active in
natural resource extraction to go on record about the payments they make to foreign
governments for natural resource rights.147 In support of this effort, on June 26,
146. With respect to crucially important environmental reporting and disclosure, there is no other reliable

mechanism of accessible public reporting and accountability. See generally Wendy Wagner, Commons
Ignorance: the Failure of Environmental Law to Provide The Information Needed to
Protect Public Health and the Environment (2007).
147. See Extractive Industries Transparency Disclosure Act, H.R. 6066 110th Cong. (introduced May 15,

2008); Extractive Industries Transparency Disclosure Act, S. 3389 110th Cong. (introduced July 31,
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2008, I testified before the House Financial Services Committee in favor of the
Extractive Industries Transparency and Disclosure Act (“EITDA”). (My written
testimony appears as Appendix A.) The EITDA would provide a better basis for
evaluating the payments that corporations make to foreign governments for natural
resource rights. Disclosure of these payments would help investors and other
constituencies gain a better appreciation of the financial, political, and reputational
risks inherent in international mining and extractive projects. The disclosures would
also benefit international nongovernmental organizations in identifying whether
corporate payments for natural resource rights have been appropriated by corrupt
officials and diverted from socially productive uses.
There is also a movement afoot to expand SEC mandated corporate reporting of
payments to politically exposed persons, consistent with the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act’s requirements and prohibitions. The anti-money laundering and antiterrorism initiatives adopted under the USA Patriot Act, as well as various
amendments to international bank secrecy laws, would also be fostered by such an
expansion of SEC-mandated corporate reporting.148
VII. CONCLUSION

In this article I have endeavored to describe certain salient historical, social, and
legal developments in the field of CSR. In addition, I have attempted to describe the
gulf between the traditional business law curriculum and CSR concerns, and have
offered some new strategies and insights for incorporating CSR issues within the
traditional business law curriculum.
The contemporary policy landscape is rife with examples of corporate greed and
corruption, and many of the best scientists believe that the planet’s temperature is
rising as a result of corporate manufacturing and global consumption. The status of
international human rights is increasingly of concern not only to governments, but
also to consumers and investors, and hence to businesses. Changes in information
technology are making it virtually impossible for companies to cover up major
accidents or instances of abuse, which means that the direct and indirect costs of
such conduct will escalate for companies.
Business schools have become more aware of the need to help future corporate
leaders be better prepared to confront these challenges. And as CSR is attaining
critical mass as a social movement, there is likely to be sustained pressure from
consumers and investors for businesses to take fuller account of what had been
deemed externalities. Law schools that fail to prepare their students for this new
environment—fail to alert them to this broader dimension of corporate counseling—
will fall behind.
2008).
148. USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 243

(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). See generally Securities and Exchange
Commission, Spotlight on Anti-Money Laundering Rulemaking, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
moneylaundering.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2009).
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APPENDIX A

Prepared Testimony Before the United States House of Representatives
Committee on Financial Services
Faith Stevelman, Professor of Law, New York Law School
June 26, 2008
Members of Congress, Ladies and Gentleman, I am honored you have invited
me to express my views on H.R. 6066, the Extractive Industries Transparency
Disclosure Act (the EITDA). I am eager to answer any questions you may ask me as
a Professor of Law specializing in corporate governance and securities regulation.
As you know, the Act you are vetting today would require enhanced informational
disclosure by international extractive enterprises having a sufficient U.S. presence so
that they or their affiliates fall under the SEC’s periodic reporting requirements. In
particular, the Act calls for such firms to make annual, publicly searchable reports to
the SEC of all payments they’ve made to foreign governments for natural resources
and extraction rights, with the exception of payments less than $100,000.
Such enhanced informational reporting would allow current and prospective
investors in covered companies better to evaluate the natural resources and rights
which their firms have obtained, as well as the costs and potential risks, legal as well
as economic, incurred in obtaining them. In this manner, the Extractive Industries
Transparency Disclosure Act would empower individual shareholders and the
securities market in general better to evaluate the risk/reward profile of individual
extractive projects, and better to compare different projects within and among
companies covered by the Act. In addition, the Act would enhance covered
companies’ incentives to comply with the existing legal prohibitions against off-the
book payments and bribes, and would enhance law abiding covered companies’ ability
to attest to the legitimate, genuinely negotiated, market-based terms of the natural
resource rights in foreign countries.
The Act is consistent with Congress’ broader objectives in regulating interstate
commerce and overseeing the system of public reporting to investors—viz., enhancing
market efficiency, sustaining current levels of market liquidity and empowering and
protecting U.S. investors. As would the Act, the SEC’s periodic reporting
requirements extend to U.S. and also foreign corporations which have raised capital
in SEC-registered public offerings, have listed securities on any U.S. exchange or
have surpassed minimum numbers of record shareholders and asset values in the
U.S. In regard to the Act’s substance, the disclosures it would require are, in effect,
precise applications of already existing, more generalized disclosure mandates arising
under the headings of “Risk Factors” and “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations,” as well standards of “quantitative
materiality” endorsed by the SEC (as defined in SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No.
99 (dated August 12, 1999)).
The Act would benefit investors by facilitating their ability to value the covered
companies’ natural resources rights and contracts, and the financial and legal risks
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attaching to them. In addition, increasing investors’ confidence that they have the
information reasonably necessary to price such natural resource rights and contracts
should help lower covered companies’ costs of capital. As it would foster U.S.
investors’ confidence in investing in international extractive industries, Congress’
enactment of the EITDA would help to sustain the valuable liquidity present in this
area of the U.S. securities markets. And the additional disclosures contemplated in
the EITDA would contribute to the markets’ ability more rationally to price the
securities of covered companies.
Furthermore, the Act would help to reinforce corporate senior executive officers’
fulfillment of their duties of care, loyalty and good faith—that is, their fiduciary
obligations arising under state corporation law. To clarify, by enacting the EITDA
into law, Congress would encourage senior corporate executives to exercise their
utmost diligence, loyalty and good faith in negotiating for and capitalizing on the
value of their companies’ natural resources rights—since it’s logical that managers
most efficiently and faithfully manage resources which they are obliged to account
for publicly.
The disclosure which would be mandated by the Act would enhance investors’
ability to judge whether a covered companies’ executives have endeavored to hide or
obscure legal and financial risks related to their foreign natural resource rights. In
cases where evidence of some questionable transactions or questionable reporting
practices was evident, investors could make informed judgments about their risk
tolerance, and the securities markets would (consistent with the concept of efficient
markets) impound such new information into the price of the covered companies’
securities. Investors who concluded that their securities were overpriced or vulnerable
to future losses could resolve to sell and “cut their losses.” In addition, by fostering
early detection of questionable natural resource related payments or transactions, the
Act would allow shareholders to agitate for corporate reform early on—before the
company’s overall reputation and financial health was impaired. Furthermore, the
disclosures mandated by the Act would help investors to evaluate the overall quality
of the business judgment and professional integrity of covered companies’ senior
executive officers—which should be a material factor influencing investors’ decisions
to buy, sell or hold securities.
Recent domestic and international legal developments raise the litigation-related
costs for extractive firms implicated in illicit transactions with foreign governments.
In this regard, the Act would shed light on a facet of international corporate
transacting that increasingly exposes U.S. investors to substantial, difficult to
quantify litigation-related financial risk and costs. Faithful reporting under the
EITDA would help law abiding covered companies immunize themselves from
serious legal claims. By allowing for better verification that covered companies have
obtained their rights to foreign-based natural resources through lawful, market-based
negotiations and agreements with the foreign country’s officials, the EITDA would
enhance investors’ confidence about the enforceability of their firms’ foreign-based
natural resource rights and contracts. To clarify, the reports which would be mandated
by the EITDA would help investors better evaluate whether their company’s rights
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are unassailable and safe from expropriation by foreign governments claiming
illegality, fraud or other serious abuses. Once again, the disclosure contemplated by
the Act would foster investors’ opportunities to make informed investment choices.
In addition, it would foster law abiding, “market-transacting” firms’ ability to profit
from the enhanced investor confidence they would foreseeably garner from complying
with high ethical standards and legally mandated reporting requirements in regard
to their foreign transactions in natural resources rights.
Furthermore, because covered companies’ could use good faith reporting under
the EITDA to help attest to the propriety of their foreign transactions in natural
resource rights, these reports might represent a low cost means of protecting these
companies against “globalization backlash” and the wide ranging, heightened
conduct-based regulatory requirements it might inspire. Such expanded regulatory
requirements would foreseeably exceed the minimal administrative and reporting
costs which would arise under the EITDA. By negative comparison with covered,
reporting firms, if enacted, the Act would stigmatize extractive companies which
refused to or failed to make credible, comprehensive, verifiable disclosures of the
data called for thereunder. Again by negative implication, investors would become
sensitized to the greater risks associated with investing in firms which refused to or
failed to make the disclosures contemplated by the EITDA.
The EITDA is well drafted—it should broadly accomplish its goals at low cost.
First, in terms of its efficacy, the Act would be extraordinarily comprehensive in its
coverage. According to data compiled by Publish What You Pay, it would reach at
least 90% of the major companies active in international natural resource
extraction —that is, very few major extractive enterprises doing business internationally
would fall outside of the Act’s mandatory disclosure requirements. Hence, only a
very small population of major international extractive firms would be in a position
even to attempt to garner a comparative advantage from maintaining the
confidentiality of their foreign transactions in natural resource rights. (The
comparative advantage/disadvantage issue is addressed further below in this
Testimony’s concluding remarks.)
In regard to the burdens it would impose, most importantly, apart from its newly
expanded disclosure requirement, the Act proposes no new conduct requirements or
conduct prohibitions on extractive enterprises. Corporate acts and transactions
which were already unlawful remain unlawful. And leaving aside (non)disclosure,
corporate acts and transactions which were lawful remain lawful.
Nor, even, would the additional mandatory disclosures contemplated by the Act
give rise to new information gathering costs for U.S. reporting firms—since any
reasonably efficient international business would presumably have the relevant
information called for by the Act readily at hand. For the most part, the Act would
not even require new oversight or compliance measures or systems of verification.
This is because the accurate reporting of transactions and maintenance of internal
controls procedures sufficient to produce accurate corporate books and records was
made mandatory for SEC reporting companies more than thirty years ago by
Congress’ enactment of the books and records provisions of the Foreign Corrupt
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Practices Act (as codified in Section 13(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act). And
Congress has consistently reinforced this emphasis on accurate corporate reporting
and effective corporate auditing—for example by enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
and the USA Patriot Act.
You will undoubtedly consider certain superficially worrisome but ultimately
insubstantial critiques of the Act. You may ask why, if disclosure is good for companies
and shareholders, we cannot rely on corporate managers voluntarily to provide it to
shareholders? The answer—as we are more mindful after the fall of Enron and
WorldCom—is that managers may fail to disclose corporate information for selfserving reasons. They may be inclined to use material nonpublic information to profit
from trading on undisclosed or selectively disclosed good or bad news. (The limited
budgetary resources of the SEC ensures that not all illicit trading by senior executives
will be detected or redressed.)
Even more importantly, corporate senior executives would naturally prefer to
minimize and obscure the importance of unfavorable events and transactions which
would cast doubt on the quality of their leadership and business judgment. This
insight points to the EITDA’s relationship to the basic architecture of corporate and
securities law. The American corporate governance bargain is that managers and not
shareholders get to make business decisions and investors cannot second-guess
managers’ lawful business judgments made in good faith. The flip side of this bargain
however, as enforced by the federal securities laws and regulations, is that shareholders
must be afforded detailed, accurate information about the firm’s assets, operations
and financial condition—information illustrative of the quality of their managers’
decision making and professional integrity—so that they can make informed choices
about buying, selling or holding their securities. In this regard, the informational
disclosure contemplated by the EITDA fits neatly into the broader scheme of U.S.
corporate and securities laws.
Voluntary disclosure has several other essential defects. First, of course,
companies can simply ignore voluntary disclosure mandates. Furthermore, an
informational environment filled with spotty, unreliable and incomplete disclosures
undermines the usefulness of even reliable reports which investors might voluntarily
receive. Disclosure that is voluntary will inevitably be uneven and ad hoc—in
essence, impressionistic. For this reason, it will not allow for meaningful
comparability—which is to say will not accomplish meaningful transparency—
among and between extractive companies and projects.
In addition, investors and the marketplace will inevitably discount the credibility
and accuracy of disclosures which are merely voluntary in nature. The marketplace
cannot adequately distinguish between earnest voluntary disclosure and self-serving,
potentially misleading corporate “spin.” For this reason, companies cannot use
voluntary publicity to garner the full financial benefits which would accrue from
their making systematic, legally mandated disclosures. Furthermore, by enacting
the EITDA into law, Congress can signal to companies and investors, as well as
broader constituencies, the seriousness of the principles at stake in achieving greater
transparency in regard to international natural resource transactions.
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It is also crucially important to consider the enforcement mechanisms
contemplated—and not contemplated—by the Act. In particular, the Act does not
contemplate a private cause of action for companies’ failure to supply the information
mandated thereunder. In this regard it is consonant with recent Acts of Congress
which have reflected concern about the costs which may be imposed on businesses by
vexatious private suits.
Nor would the broader framework of private remedies for securities fraud afford
a basis for suits by investors. In particular, the limits and safeguards which Congress,
the SEC and the federal courts have imposed on private investor suits for fraud—for
example, heightened pleading requirements and proof of loss causation and
scienter—would effectively preclude investors from using the existing antifraud
prohibitions under the federal securities laws to bring claims alleging deficient
EITDA reporting.
In the alternative, enforcement of the Act’s disclosure requirements would fall to
the discretion of the SEC, under the oversight, in most cases, of the federal courts.
Most notably (leaving aside cases of notorious, repeated, material disclosure
deficiencies, gross financial frauds and instances of market manipulation and insider
trading), SEC enforcement actions rarely have resulted in substantial corporate fines
or penalties. In responding to perceived shortcomings in the kind of reporting
contemplated under EITDA, the SEC has most commonly sought civil injunctions
or obtained consent decrees prohibiting future disclosure violations. Moreover, even
if the SEC succeeds in proving a claim of materially deficient reporting in federal
court (monetary fines against reporting companies are unavailable in administrative
actions), Section 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 establishes a three
tiered system of fines and penalties which caps the remedies which the SEC may
obtain—again, absent egregious facts or fraudulent or repeated reckless disclosure
deficiencies—at $50,000 per corporate violation.
One final important critique of the Act should be addressed—that is, the issue of
whether the EITDA would confer a comparative advantage on companies falling
outside its reach. Certain features of this critique have been addressed
previously—most importantly, that very few major, international extractive enterprises
would fall outside of the Act’s disclosure requirements. Secondly, the above discussion
highlighted how investors—and hence companies seeking to raise capital at efficient
prices and the securities markets in general—stand to benefit from the disclosures
which would be legally mandated by the Act’s passage. Furthermore, that certain
firms might fall outside of the EITDA—even that certain firms fall outside of the
scope of the U.S. securities laws in general—is a poor rationale for endorsing lax U.S.
standards and requirements. That is, the United States has long been a leader in
advocating standards of good corporate governance, and systems of accurate corporate
reporting—and these standards and requirements have helped keep our markets
strong and stable, have supported capital formation and protected investors’ faith in
investing.
As it turns out, moreover, the comparative disadvantage argument is inherently
shaky. Its fatal flaw is that truly repressive foreign governments are unlikely to make
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decisions about which businesses to transact with based on the presence or absence of
the kind of reporting requirements contemplated by the EITDA. Governments
which have histories of high levels of corruption and which are likely to demand offthe-books payments in connection with the sale of resource rights are unlikely to be
substantially affected by whether the terms of such transactions are subject to a
publicly searchable filing with the SEC.
Second, regarding the issue of comparative disadvantage, if companies subject to
U.S. reporting requirements pay bribes to foreign officials or engage in off-the-books
transactions in obtaining natural resource rights, they are breaking U.S. federal laws
which predate the EITDA. If companies cannot do business in conformity with the
limits and standards established by Congress, then they should address this broader
issue directly, rather than under cover of opposing the EITDA. Congress’
consideration of the EITDA should not become a tacit vehicle for backing away
from the anti-bribery, anti-money laundering and anti-corruption/national security
laws which it has previously enacted.
This testimony has described how the passage of the EITDA might afford
companies who embrace its disclosure mandates a comparative advantage in attracting
publicly traded equity capital. Indeed, such companies should be more likely not only
to attract public equity capital at favorable rates, but also private equity capital and
debt financing, private and public. The reporting requirements contemplated by the
Act are consonant with Congress’ and the SEC’s longstanding commitment to
enhancing market efficiency and the rule of law underpinnings of free markets in
general. In conclusion, the enactment of the Extractive Industries’ Disclosure and
Transparency Act would advance the welfare of U.S. investors and the market for
securities of SEC reporting companies involved in international natural resource
extraction, while imposing little cost on the firms it governs.
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